question

T he Elements of
Moral Philosophy

EIGHTH EDITION

James Rachels
Editions 5–8 by

Stuart Rachels

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd irac19065_fm_i-xii.indd i 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY, EIGHTH EDITION

Published by McGraw-Hill Education, 2 Penn Plaza, New York, NY 10121. Copyright © 2015
by  McGraw-Hill Education. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America.
Previous editions © 2012, 2010, and 2007. No part of this publication may be reproduced or
distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without
the prior written consent of McGraw-Hill Education, including, but not limited to, in any
network or other electronic storage or transmission, or broadcast for distance learning.

Some ancillaries, including electronic and print components, may not be available to customers
outside the United States.

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 DOC/DOC 1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4

ISBN 978-0-07-811906-4
MHID 0-07-811906-5

Senior Vice President, Products & Markets: Kurt L. Strand
Vice President, General Manager, Products & Markets: Michael Ryan
Vice President, Content Design & Delivery: Kimberly Meriwether David
Managing Director: William Glass
Lead Product Developer: Lisa Pinto
Product Developer: Jamie Daron
Director, Content Design & Delivery: Terri Schiesl
Content Project Manager: Lisa Bruflodt
Buyer: Jennifer Pickel
Cover Designer: Studio Montage, St. Louis, MO
Compositor: Lumina Datamatics, Inc.
Typeface: 11/12 New Baskerville
Printer: R. R. Donnelley

Cover painting: Aleksandr Rodchenko. (Russian, 1891–1956). Non-Objective Painting no. 80 (Black
on Black). 1918. Oil on canvas, 32 1/4″ × 31 1/4″ (81.9 × 79.4 cm). Gift of the artist, through Jay
Leyda. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Digital Image © 2006 The Museum of Modern
Art/Licensed by Scala/Art Resource, NY. © Alexander Rodchenko/RAO, Moscow/VAGA, New York

All credits appearing on page or at the end of the book are considered to be an extension of
the copyright page.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Rachels, Stuart, 1969–
The elements of moral philosophy/James Rachels; Editions 5–8 by Stuart Rachels.—8th ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-07-811906-4 (alk. paper)
1. Ethics—Textbooks. I. Rachels, James, 1941–2003. Elements of moral philosophy. II. Title.
BJ1012.R29 2014
170—dc23 2014022611

www.mhhe.com

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd iirac19065_fm_i-xii.indd ii 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

iii

James Rachels (1941–2003) wrote The End of Life: Euthanasia
and Morality (1986), Created from Animals: The Moral Implica-
tions of Darwinism (1990), Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other
Essays in Moral Philosophy (1997), Problems from Philosophy (first
edition, 2005), and The Legacy of Socrates: Essays in Moral Phi-
losophy (2007). His website is www.jamesrachels.org .

Stuart Rachels is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the
University of Alabama. He has revised several of James Rachels’
books, including Problems from Philosophy as well as the compan-
ion anthology to this book, The Right Thing to Do . Stuart won
the United States Chess Championship in 1989, at the age of
20, and is a Bronze Life Master at bridge. He is currently writ-
ing a book about his chess career called The Best I Saw in Chess .

About the Authors

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd iiirac19065_fm_i-xii.indd iii 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd ivrac19065_fm_i-xii.indd iv 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

v

Contents

Preface ix
About the Eighth Edition xi

1. WHAT IS MORALITY? 1

1.1. The Problem of Definition 1
1.2. First Example: Baby Theresa 1
1.3. Second Example: Jodie and Mary 6
1.4. Third Example: Tracy Latimer 8
1.5. Reason and Impartiality 10
1.6. The Minimum Conception of Morality 13

2. THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM 15

2.1. Different Cultures Have Different Moral Codes 15
2.2. Cultural Relativism 17
2.3. The Cultural Differences Argument 18
2.4. What Follows from Cultural Relativism 20
2.5. Why There Is Less Disagreement Than There Seems to Be 22
2.6. Some Values Are Shared by All Cultures 24
2.7. Judging a Cultural Practice to Be Undesirable 25
2.8. Back to the Five Claims 28
2.9. What We Can Learn from Cultural Relativism 30

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd vrac19065_fm_i-xii.indd v 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

vi CONTENTS

3. SUBJECTIVISM IN ETHICS 33

3.1. The Basic Idea of Ethical Subjectivism 33
3.2. The Linguistic Turn 35
3.3. The Denial of Value 39
3.4. Ethics and Science 41
3.5. The Question of Same-Sex Relations 43

4. DOES MORALITY DEPEND ON RELIGION? 49

4.1. The Presumed Connection between Morality and Religion 49
4.2. The Divine Command Theory 51
4.3. The Theory of Natural 55
4.4. Religion and Particular Moral Issues 58

5. ETHICAL EGOISM 64

5.1. Is There a Duty to Help the Starving? 64
5.2. Psychological Egoism 65
5.3. Three Arguments for Ethical Egoism 71
5.4. Three Arguments against Ethical Egoism 76

6. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 82

6.1. Hobbes’s Argument 82
6.2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma 85
6.3. Some Advantages of the Social Contract Theory 89
6.4. The Problem of Civil Disobedience 92
6.5. Difficulties for the Theory 95

7. THE UTILITARIAN APPROACH 99

7.1. The Revolution in Ethics 99
7.2. First Example: Euthanasia 100
7.3. Second Example: Marijuana 103
7.4. Third Example: Nonhuman Animals 106

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd virac19065_fm_i-xii.indd vi 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

8. THE DEBATE OVER UTILITARIANISM 111

8.1. The Classical Version of the Theory 111
8.2. Is Pleasure All That Matters? 112
8.3. Are Consequences All That Matter? 113
8.4. Should We Be Equally Concerned for Everyone? 117
8.5. The Defense of Utilitarianism 119
8.6. Concluding Thoughts 125

9. ARE THERE ABSOLUTE MORAL RULES? 126

9.1. Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe 126
9.2. The Categorical Imperative 129
9.3. Kant’s Arguments on Lying 131
9.4. Conflicts between Rules 133
9.5. Kant’s Insight 135

10. KANT AND RESPECT FOR PERSONS 137

10.1. Kant’s Core Ideas 137
10.2. Retribution and Utility in the Theory of Punishment 140
10.3. Kant’s Retributivism 143

11. FEMINISM AND THE ETHICS OF CARE 147

11.1. Do Women and Men Think Differently about Ethics? 147
11.2. Implications for Moral Judgment 153
11.3. Implications for Ethical Theory 157

12. VIRTUE ETHICS 159

12.1. The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Right Action 159
12.2. The Virtues 161
12.3. Two Advantages of Virtue Ethics 169
12.4. Virtue and Conduct 171
12.5. The Problem of Incompleteness 172
12.6. Conclusion 173

CONTENTS vii

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd viirac19065_fm_i-xii.indd vii 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

13. WHAT WOULD A SATISFACTORY MORAL
THEORY  BE LIKE? 175

13.1. Morality without Hubris 175
13.2. Treating People as They Deserve 177
13.3. A Variety of Motives 178
13.4. Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism 179
13.5. The Moral Community 182
13.6. Justice and Fairness 183
13.7. Conclusion 184

Notes on Sources 185
Index 197

viii CONTENTS

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd viiirac19065_fm_i-xii.indd viii 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

ix

Socrates, one of the first and best moral philosophers, said
that morality is about “no small matter, but how we ought to
live.” This book is an introduction to moral philosophy, con-
ceived in that broad sense.

In writing this book, I have been guided by the follow-
ing thought: Suppose that someone has never studied ethics
but wants to do so now. What are the first things he or she
should learn? This book is my answer to that question. I do
not try to cover every topic in the field, nor is my coverage
of any particular topic complete. Instead, I try to discuss the
ideas that a newcomer should confront.

The chapters may be read independently of one another—
they are, in effect, separate essays. Thus, someone who is inter-
ested in Ethical Egoism could go straight to Chapter 5 and
find a self-contained introduction to that theory. When read
in order, however, the chapters tell a more or less continu-
ous story. The first presents a “minimum conception” of what
morality is; the middle chapters cover the most important ethi-
cal theories; and the last chapter presents my own view of what
a satisfactory moral theory would be like.

However, the point of this book is not to provide a neat,
unified account of “the truth” about ethics. That would be
a poor way to introduce the subject. Philosophy is not like
physics. In physics, there is a large body of accepted truth that
beginners must patiently master. There are, of course, unre-
solved controversies in physics, but these take place against a
background of broad agreement. In philosophy, by contrast,
everything is controversial—or almost everything. Some of
the fundamental issues are still up for grabs. Newcomers to
philosophy may ask themselves whether a moral theory such
as Utilitarianism seems correct. However, newcomers to phys-
ics are rarely encouraged to make up their own minds about

P reface

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd ixrac19065_fm_i-xii.indd ix 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

the laws of thermodynamics. A good introduction to ethics will
not try to hide that somewhat embarrassing fact.

You will find, then, a survey of contending ideas, theo ries,
and arguments. I find some of these proposals more appealing
than others, and a philosopher who made different assessments
would no doubt write a different book. Thus, my own views
inevitably color the presentation. But I try to present the con-
tending ideas fairly, and when I pass judgment on an argument,
I do my best to explain why. Philosophy, like morality itself,
is first and last an exercise in reason; we should embrace the
ideas that are supported by the best arguments. If this book
is successful, then the reader can begin to assess where the
weight of reason rests.

x PREFACE

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd xrac19065_fm_i-xii.indd x 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

xi

In preparing the eighth edition, I improved the wording of
around 850 sentences. Readers of the seventh edition might
not notice these changes, but I hope the new edition feels
well written.

The most significant changes are to Chapter 3, “Sub-
jectivism in Ethics.” This is the only chapter that instructors
familiar with the seventh edition need to reread in full. In
previous editions, we discussed the semantic implications of
Ethical Subjectivism without addressing its metaphysical core.
Now, however, we discuss nihilism. The middle sections of
the chapter have been substantially revised, though much of
the old chapter’s content remains. Simple Subjectivism and
Emotivism are still discussed, though now alongside John L.
Mackie’s “Error Theory.” The second argument against Sim-
ple Subjectivism (that it entails infallibility) has been removed.
The last section of the chapter has been updated and is now
called “The Question of Same-Sex Relations.”

Otherwise, the book contains only minor revisions:

• In Chapter 2, “The Challenge of Cultural Relativism,”
the second claim of Cultural Relativism—that right and
wrong are determined by a society’s norms—is now sin-
gled out as being central to the theory (section 2.2).

• In Chapter 6, “The Social Contract Theory,” I elimi-
nated the objection that infants could be tortured
because they cannot benefit us (section 6.5). I was
troubled by the response that rules forbidding infant
torture would benefit us because we were once infants
ourselves and were thus vulnerable to such abuse.

• In Chapter 7, “The Utilitarian Approach,” I removed
the reference to the high medical bills of heavy mar-
ijuana users because there seem to be no such bills

About the Eighth Edition

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd xirac19065_fm_i-xii.indd xi 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

xii ABOUT THE EIGHTH EDITION

( section 7.3). Also, I now discuss two further costs of
the current marijuana laws.

• In Chapter 11, “Feminism and the Ethics of Care,” I
now elaborate on the fact that feminism, as a field, is
much wider than the ethics of care (section 11.2).

• In Chapter 12, “Virtue Ethics,” I added “ resourcefulness”
to the list of virtues and replaced “industriousness” with
“diligence.” Also, I removed “courteousness” because of
its similarity to “civility.”

• In Chapter 13, “What Would a Satisfactory Moral Theory
Be Like?,” I removed the sentence, “A person’s volun-
tary actions can justify a departure from the policy of
‘equal treatment,’ but nothing else can” (section  13.6).
According to Multiple-Strategies Utilitarianism, a mother
is justified in departing from the policy of equal treat-
ment with respect to her own child, even though this
has nothing to do with the child’s voluntary actions.

Other changes are even less significant.
For their help, I thank Luke Barber, Seth Bordner,

Ed Brandon, Matthew Brophy, Janice Daurio, Heather Elliott,
Daniel Hollingshead, Lisa Kemmerer, Justin Klockseim, Kaave
Lajevardi, Cayce Moore, Tucker Myers, Howard Pospesel, Jim
Robinson, and Chase Wrenn. My biggest debt is to my best
proofreader, Carol Rachels.

James Rachels, a wonderful man, was the sole author of
this book in its first four editions. To learn more about him,
visit www.jamesrachels.org .

Tell me your thoughts about the book: srachels@as.
ua.edu.

—Stuart Rachels

rac19065_fm_i-xii.indd xiirac19065_fm_i-xii.indd xii 9/5/14 5:32 PM9/5/14 5:32 PM

1

CHAPTER 1
What Is Morality?
We are discussing no small matter, but how we ought to live.

S ocrates , in P lato’s REPUBLIC (ca. 390 bc )

1.1. The Problem of Definition
Moral philosophy is the study of what morality is and what it
requires of us. As Socrates said, it’s about “how we ought to
live”—and why. It would be helpful if we could begin with
a simple, uncontroversial definition of what morality is, but
unfortunately we cannot. There are many rival theories, each
expounding a different conception of what it means to live
morally, and any definition that goes beyond Socrates’s simple
formulation is bound to offend at least one of them.

This should make us cautious, but it need not paralyze
us. In this chapter, I will describe the “minimum concep-
tion” of morality. As the name suggests, the minimum con-
ception is a core that every moral theory should accept, at
least as a starting point. First, however, we will examine some
moral controversies having to do with handicapped children.
This discussion will bring out the features of the minimum
conception.

1.2. First Example: Baby Theresa
Theresa Ann Campo Pearson, an infant known to the public
as “Baby Theresa,” was born in Florida in 1992. Baby Theresa
had anencephaly, one of the worst genetic disorders. Anen-
cephalic infants are sometimes referred to as “babies without
brains,” but that is not quite accurate. Important parts of

rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 1rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 1 9/5/14 2:44 PM9/5/14 2:44 PM

2 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

the brain—the cerebrum and cerebellum—are missing, as is
the top of the skull. The brain stem, however, is still there,
and so the baby can breathe and possess a heartbeat. In the
United States, most cases of anencephaly are detected dur-
ing pregnancy, and the fetuses are usually aborted. Of those
not aborted, half are stillborn. Only a few hundred are born
alive each year, and they usually die within days.

Baby Theresa’s story is remarkable only because her par-
ents made an unusual request. Knowing that their baby would
die soon and could never be conscious, Theresa’s parents vol-
unteered her organs for immediate transplant. They thought
that her kidneys, liver, heart, lungs, and eyes should go to
other children who could benefit from them. Her physicians
agreed. Thousands of infants need transplants each year, and
there are never enough organs available. But Theresa’s organs
were not taken, because Florida law forbids the removal of
organs until the donor has died. By the time Baby Theresa
died, nine days later, it was too late—her organs had deterio-
rated too much to be harvested and transplanted.

Baby Theresa’s case was widely debated. Should she have
been killed so that her organs could have been used to save
other children? A number of professional “ethicists”—people
employed by universities, hospitals, and law schools, who get
paid to think about such things—were asked by the press to
comment. Most of them disagreed with the parents and phy-
sicians. Instead, they appealed to time-honored philosophi-
cal principles to oppose taking the organs. “It just seems too
horrifying to use people as means to other people’s ends,”
said one such expert. Another explained: “It’s unethical to
kill person A to save person B.” And a third added: “What
the parents are really asking for is, Kill this dying baby so that
its organs may be used for someone else. Well, that’s really a
horrendous proposition.”

Is it horrendous? Opinions were divided. These ethicists
thought so, while the parents and doctors did not. But we are
interested in more than what people happen to believe. We
want to know what’s true. Were the parents right or wrong to
volunteer their baby’s organs for transplant? To answer this
question, we have to ask what reasons, or arguments, can be
given on each side. What can be said for or against the parents’
request?

rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 2rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 2 9/5/14 2:44 PM9/5/14 2:44 PM

WHAT IS MORALITY ? 3

The Benefits Argument. The parents believed that Theresa’s
organs were doing her no good, because she was not con-
scious and was bound to die soon. The other children,
however, could be helped. Thus, the parents seem to have
reasoned: If we can benefit someone without harming anyone else,
we ought to do so. Transplanting the organs would benefit the other
children without harming Baby Theresa. Therefore, we ought to
transplant the organs.

Is this correct? Not every argument is sound. In addi-
tion to knowing what arguments can be given for a view, we
also want to know whether those arguments are any good.
Generally speaking, an argument is sound if its assumptions
are true and the conclusion follows logically from them. In
this case, the argument has two assumptions: that we should
help someone if no harm would come of it, and that the
transplant would help the other children without harming
Theresa. We might wonder, however, about the claim that
Theresa wouldn’t be harmed. After all, she would die, and
isn’t being alive better than being dead? But on reflection,
it seems clear that, in these tragic circumstances, the parents
were right. Being alive is a benefit only if you can carry on
activities and have thoughts, feelings, and relations with other
people—in other words, if you have a life . Without such things,
biological existence has no value. Therefore, even though
Theresa might remain alive for a few more days, it would do
her no good.

The Benefits Argument, therefore, provides a powerful
reason for transplanting the organs. What arguments exist on
the other side?

The Argument That We Should Not Use People as Means. The
ethicists who opposed the transplants offered two arguments.
The first was based on the idea that it is wrong to use people as
means to other people’s ends . Taking Theresa’s organs would be
using her to benefit the other children; therefore, it should not
be done.

Is this argument sound? The idea that we should not
“use” people is appealing, but this idea is vague. What exactly
does it mean? “Using people” typically involves violating their
autonomy —their ability to decide for themselves how to live
their own lives, according to their own desires and values.

rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 3rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 3 9/5/14 2:44 PM9/5/14 2:44 PM

4 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

A person’s autonomy may be violated through manipulation,
trickery, or deceit. For example, I may pretend to be your
friend, when I am only interested in going out with your sis-
ter; or I may lie to you so you’ll give me money; or I may
try to convince you that you would enjoy going to a movie,
when, really, I only want you to give me a ride. In each case,
I am manipulating you in order to get something for myself.
Autonomy is also violated when people are forced to do things
against their will. This explains why “using people” is wrong;
it is wrong because it thwarts their autonomy.

Taking Baby Theresa’s organs, however, could not thwart
her autonomy, because she has no autonomy—she cannot
make decisions, she has no desires, and she cannot value any-
thing. Would taking her organs be “using her” in any other
morally significant sense? We would, of course, be using her
organs for someone else’s benefit. But we do that every time
we perform a transplant. We would also be using her organs
without her permission. Would that make it wrong? If we were
using them against her wishes, then that would be a reason for
objecting—it would violate her autonomy. But Baby Theresa
has no wishes.

When people are unable to make decisions for themselves,
and others must step in, there are two reasonable guidelines
that might be adopted. First, we might ask, What would be in
their own best interests? If we apply this standard to Baby Theresa,
there would be no problem with taking her organs, for, as we
have already noted, her interests will not be affected. She is
not conscious, and she will die soon no matter what.

The second guideline appeals to the person’s own pref-
erences: We might ask, If she could tell us what she wants, what
would she say? This sort of thought is useful when we are deal-
ing with people who have preferences (or once had them) but
cannot express them—for example, a comatose patient who
signed a living will before slipping into the coma. But, sadly,
Baby Theresa has no preferences about anything, nor has she
ever had any. So we can get no guidance from her, even in
our imaginations. The upshot is that we are left to do what
we think is best.

The Argument from the Wrongness of Killing. The ethicists
also appealed to the principle that it is wrong to kill one person

rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 4rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 4 9/5/14 2:44 PM9/5/14 2:44 PM

WHAT IS MORALITY ? 5

to save another. Taking Theresa’s organs would be killing her
to save others, they said; so, taking the organs would be wrong.

Is this argument sound? The prohibition against killing
is certainly among the most important moral rules. Neverthe-
less, few people believe it is always wrong to kill—most peo-
ple think there are exceptions, such as killing in self-defense.
The question, then, is whether taking Baby Theresa’s organs
should be regarded as another exception. There are many
reasons to think so: Baby Theresa is not conscious; she will
never have a life; she is going to die soon; and taking her
organs would help the other babies. Anyone who accepts this
will regard the argument as flawed. Usually, it is wrong to kill
one person to save another, but not always.

There is another possibility. Perhaps we should regard
Baby Theresa as already dead. If this sounds crazy, bear
in mind that our conception of death has changed over
the years. In 1967, the South African doctor Christiaan
Barnard performed the first heart transplant in a human
being. This was an exciting development; heart transplants
could potentially save many lives. It was not clear, however,
whether any lives could be saved in the United States. Back
then, American law understood death as occurring when the
heart stops beating. But once a heart stops beating, it quickly
degrades and becomes unsuitable for transplant. Thus, under
American law, it was not clear whether any hearts could be
legally harvested for transplant. So American law changed.
We now understand death as occurring, not when the heart
stops beating, but when the brain stops functioning: “brain
death” is our new end-of-life standard. This solved the prob-
lem about transplants because a brain-dead patient can still
have a healthy heart, suitable for transplant.

Anencephalics do not meet the technical requirements
for brain death as that term is currently defined; but per-
haps the definition should be revised to include them. After
all, they lack any hope for conscious life, because they have
no cerebrum or cerebellum. If the definition of brain death
were reformulated to include anencephalics, then we would
become accustomed to the idea that these unfortunate infants
are stillborn, and so taking their organs would not involve
killing them. The Argument from the Wrongness of Killing
would then be moot.

rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 5rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 5 9/5/14 2:44 PM9/5/14 2:44 PM

6 THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY

On the whole, then, the arguments in favor of transplant-
ing Baby Theresa’s organs seem stronger than the arguments
against it.

1.3. Second Example: Jodie and Mary
In August 2000, a young woman from Gozo, an island south of
Italy, discovered that she was carrying conjoined twins. Know-
ing that the health-care facilities on Gozo couldn’t handle such
a birth, she and her husband went to St. Mary’s Hospital in
Manchester, England. The infants, known as Mary and Jodie,
were joined at the lower abdomen. Their spines were fused,
and they had one heart and one pair of lungs between them.
Jodie, the stronger one, was providing blood for her sister.

No one knows how many sets of conjoined twins are born
each year, but the number seems to be in the hundreds. Most
die shortly after birth, but some do well. They grow to adult-
hood and marry and have children themselves. However, the
outlook for Mary and Jodie was grim. The doctors said that
without intervention the girls would die within six months.
The only hope was an operation to separate them. This would
save Jodie, but Mary would die immediately.

The parents, who were devout Catholics, opposed the
operation on the grounds that it would hasten Mary’s death.
“We believe that nature should take its course,” they said. “If
it’s God’s will that both our children should not survive, then
so be it.” The hospital, hoping to save Jodie, petitioned the
courts for permission to perform the operation anyway. The
courts agreed, and the operation was performed. As expected,
Jodie lived and Mary died.

In thinking about this case, we should distinguish the
question of who should make the decision from the question of
what the decision should be . You might think, for example, that
the parents should be the ones to decide, and so the courts
were wrong to intrude. But there remains the separate ques-
tion of what would be the wisest choice for the parents (or
anyone else) to make. We will focus on that question: Would
it be right or wrong to separate the twins?

The Argument That We Should Save as Many as We Can. The
rationale for separating the twins is that we have a choice

rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 6rac19065_ch01_001-014.indd 6 9/5/14 2:44 PM9/5/14 2:44 PM

WHAT IS MORALITY ? 7

between saving one infant or letting both die. Isn’t it plainly
better to save one? This argument is so appealing that many
people will conclude, without further thought, that the twins
should be separated. At the height of the controversy, the
Ladies’ Home Journal commissioned a …