Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis

251

C H A P T E R 3 2

Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—
Learning from the Past1

James H. Hansen

Hansen was a 30-year veteran of DIA, serving as a senior intelligence analyst until 1990.
He then joined the CIA as an analyst and operations officer.

Moscow’s surreptitious dispatch of nuclear-capable SS-4 and SS-5 surface-to-surface
missiles to Cuba in 1962 upset the strategic balance in an alarming way.�1 The resulting
showdown—which the Russians call the “Caribbean Crisis” and the Cubans call the
“October Crisis”— brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. From its inception,
the Soviet missile operation entailed elaborate denial and deception (D&D) efforts. The
craft of denying the United States information on the deployment of the missiles and
deceiving US policymakers about the Soviet Union’s intent was the foundation of Nikita
Khrushchev’s audacious Cuban venture. Piecing together the deception activities from

1. James H. Hansen, “Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missle Crisis,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 46, No.1, 2002, pp.
49–58. Retrieved at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/
studies/vol46no1/article06.html.

Figure 1 Range of Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles and SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missiles,
if launched from Cuba.

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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

252 The Art and Science of Military Deception

declassified US, Russian, and Cuban accounts yields insights that can help us anticipate
and overcome the D&D efforts of a growing number of foreign adversaries today.

Maskirovka

Moscow has always had a flair for D&D, known in Russian as maskirovka. Its central
tenet is to prevent an adversary from discovering Russian intentions by deceiving him
about the nature, scope, and timing of an operation. Maskirovka covers a broad range
of concepts, from deception at the strategic planning level to camouflage at the troop
level.2 Russian military texts indicate that maskirovka is treated as an operational art
to be polished by professors of military science and officers who specialize in this area.

DIA analysis preceding the missile crisis noted that the Soviet Army had probably
employed large-scale battlefield deception “more frequently and with more consistent
success than any other army.”3 The Soviets practiced extensive maskirovka before their
move into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Moscow also trained foreign forces to apply decep-
tion, including North Vietnamese units before the Tet offensive in 1968 and Egyptian
forces before crossing the Suez Canal in 1973.

Close-hold Planning

Gen. Anatoli Gribkov—then a senior member of the Soviet General Staff—provides
revealing insights into the early planning of the operation. He says that, after Nikita
Khrushchev decided to emplace the missiles in Cuba in the spring of 1962, the General
Staff detailed only five officers—four generals and a colonel—to serve as the center of
the military planning apparatus. Col. Gen. Semyon Ivanov, chief of the General Staff’s
Chief Operations Directorate, was in overall charge.�4 During that summer, the circle of
collaborators and contacts expanded to include members of each of the relevant service
branches, but secrecy and need-to-know prevailed. The most senior officers brought into
the plan were at least told that Cuba was involved in the operation, but only a few were
informed of the exact nature of the mission.�5

The top civilian and military officials conceptualizing the operation did not see eye-
to-eye about the likelihood of pulling off a successful deception. At the very center of
those making the decisions stood First Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan, Pre-
sidium member Frol Kozlov, Defense Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, and Mar-
shal Sergei Biryuzov, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces.�6 Alternate Presidium
member Sharaf Rashidov was brought in as well, possibly for the cover that he later
provided for traveling delegations.7 Biryuzov and his experts believed that the deploy-
ment could be made expeditiously and secretly, without the US discovering the missiles.
Mikoyan was surprised at this judgment and believed the marshal to be a fool.�8 Rashi-
dov was confident that the missiles could be hidden, claiming that they could be placed
so as to blend in with the palm trees. Gribkov held that only somebody inexperienced in
military matters could reach such a conclusion, given the extensive preparations needed
for each missile site.

Throughout the early planning stage, no secretaries were used to prepare final typed
texts. A colonel with good penmanship wrote the proposal that the Defense Council
adopted. It grew into a full-fledged plan, still handwritten, which was approved by
Malinovsky on 4 July and Khrushchev on 7 July.9 From May through October, for
reasons of security, no communications about the proposed, planned, and actual Soviet

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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

The Art and Science of Military Deception 253

deployments in Cuba were sent, even by coded messages. Everything was hand-carried
by members of the small coterie of senior officials who were directly involved.10

Developing a Cover Story

The General Staff’s code name for the operation—ANADYR—was designed to mislead
Soviets as well as foreigners about the destination of the equipment. Anadyr is the name
of a river flowing into the Bering Sea, the capital of the Chukotsky Autonomous District,
and a bomber base in that desolate region. Operation ANADYR was designed to suggest
to lower-level Soviet commanders—and Western spies—that the action was a strategic
exercise in the far north of the USSR. Promoting the illusion, the troops that were called
up for the Cuban expedition were told only that they were going to a cold region. Those
needing more precise instructions, such as missile engineers, were informed that they
would be taking ICBMs to a site on Novaya Zemlya, a large island in the Arctic where
nuclear weapons had long been tested.11

To strengthen the concealment, many units were outfitted with skis, felt boots,
fleece-lined parkas, and other winter equipment.12 Moreover, perhaps to further back-
stop the cover plan, Moscow tapped four ground forces regiments from the Leningrad
Military District in the north for dispatch to Cuba. The deception was so thorough that
it fooled even senior Soviet officers sent to Cuba. One general there asked Gribkov why
winter equipment and clothing had been provided. The general admonished him to
“think like an adult,” and explained, “It’s called ANADYR for a reason. We could have
given away the game if we had put any tropical clothing in your kits.”13

Getting the Cubans on Board

Secrecy surrounded the first Soviet delegation that went to propose the audacious plan
to Fidel Castro and other Cuban leaders. The officials arrived in Havana with little
fanfare on 29 May, amidst a delegation of agricultural experts headed by Rashidov. The
group included Col. Gen. Ivanov and several missile construction specialists and other
military experts, whose job it was to determine whether the missiles could be deployed
in secrecy.14 Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev took Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro
aside to explain that “Engineer Petrov” in the group actually was Marshal Biryuzov, and
that he needed to meet with el lider maximo without delay. Only three hours later “Engi-
neer Petrov” was shown into Fidel Castro’s office.15 The Cuban leadership unanimously
and enthusiastically gave its approval in principle.16

Soviet maritime policy began to shift in accordance with these first trips. In June
and July, the USSR began to charter Western ships to carry general cargo from the So-
viet Union to Cuba, reserving its own freighters for carrying military cargo.17

During 2-17 July, a Cuban delegation led by Raul Castro traveled to Moscow to
discuss Soviet military shipments, including nuclear missiles. Khrushchev met with the
Defense Minister on 3 and 8 July. Raul Castro initialed a draft treaty with the Soviet
Defense Minister that governed the deployment of Soviet forces to Cuba. This pact was
not to be publicly revealed until a visit that Khrushchev planned to make to Cuba in
November.18

The Russians began to dispatch officers and specialists covertly to Cuba by air.
On 10 July, Gen. Issa Pliyev, traveling under the name “Pavlov,” arrived in Cuba to
command the Soviet contingent.19 Two days later, 67 specialists touched down. They

The Art and Science of Military Deception, edited by Hy Rothstein, and Barton Whaley, Artech House, 2013. ProQuest Ebook Central,
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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

254 The Art and Science of Military Deception

journeyed as “machine operators,” “irrigation specialists,” and “agricultural special-
ists.” Their covers, however, could not have withstood probing—they had been as-
signed to occupations about which they knew nothing. They were urged to consult the
few genuine specialists traveling with them to gain some rudimentary knowledge of
their ostensible jobs.20 On 17 July, Havana announced that Cuba and the USSR had
signed an agreement establishing a regular Moscow-Havana civil air route. US intel-
ligence analysis at the time speculated that the new Tu-114 flights were bringing Soviet
military officers and sensitive electronic and signal-monitoring equipment to Cuba.21

Then-Minister for Industry Ernesto “Che” Guevara and the head of the Cuban
militia led another delegation to Moscow during 27 August-2 September. The purpose
was to introduce Fidel Castro’s revisions into the draft treaty. The Cubans proposed
that the deployment be made public in order to head off any American overreaction;
Khrushchev, however, successfully argued for continued secrecy.

Keeping the Secret at Home

In the Soviet Union, the men and equipment destined for Cuba were assembled, loaded,
and moved by rail at night under reinforced guard. The train routes and final destina-
tions were kept secret. Mail and telegrams along the way were strictly prohibited.22

To mask the immensity of the overall effort, the shipments to Cuba left from eight
ports—four in the north (Kronstadt, Liepaya, Baltiysk, and Murmansk) and four on the
Black Sea (Sevastopol, Feodosiya, Nikolayev, and Poti).23 Western access to these ports
was closed off. It was normal for the Soviets to close ports when munitions were being
loaded, but this time the surface-to-surface missiles were being put on the ships under
tight security and cover of darkness.24

The troops were housed at nearby military facilities during the two or three days
required to load a ship. Guards were posted to prevent anyone from leaving the area.
No letters, telegrams, or telephone calls were permitted, a rule that also applied to the
officers.25 The ships’ crew members, some of whom made more than one run to Cuba,
were forbidden shore leave and correspondence.26 Secrecy was so strict that couriers
carried all messages between the ports and the Defense Ministry in Moscow.27

On board, the Soviets applied the same maskirovka measures that they had adopted
when they first began to send weapons to Cuba. Packing crates or special shipping
containers concealed and protected weapons carried as deck cargo. Certain telltale mili-
tary equipment was boarded up with planks to make it look like the ship’s superstruc-
ture. Even on-deck field kitchens were disguised.28 The Soviets shielded crated military
hardware—such as missiles and launchers—with metal sheets to defeat infrared pho-
tography.29 They stored other combat and specialized equipment below, out of sight.
Ordinary automobiles, trucks, tractors, and harvesters were placed on the top deck to
convey the impression that only civilian and agricultural gear was being transported.

The freighter Poltava, which sailed to Cuba in September, was a good example. No
external signs indicated that it was carrying missiles. On deck were cargo trucks, none of
which were associated with the missiles. Nonetheless, some US experts speculated that
the ship might be carrying ballistic missiles deep in its hold, because the Soviets tended
to use large-hatch ships of the Poltava and Omsk classes to deliver such missiles.30

The ship captains were not told where their cargoes were to be delivered. Before
casting off, the captain and the troop commander jointly received a large sealed enve-
lope. Unfastening it, they found a smaller envelope to be opened only at a certain set of

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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

The Art and Science of Military Deception 255

geographic coordinates in the Atlantic Ocean. When they reached the designated point,
an officer from the KGB’s Special Department joined them for the opening of the en-
velope. The instructions told them to proceed to a Cuban port and authorized them to
inform the ship’s company of the destination.31 The concern for secrecy permeated the
process. The last sentence of the captain’s letter read: “After familiarizing yourself with
the contents of this document, destroy it.”32

Every ship involved in Operation ANADYR carried thick folders, prepared by De-
fense Ministry staff officers, which contained background information on a number of
countries with which the USSR had good relations. The study materials on Cuba were
buried in these packets, so that not even the compilers would know the real focus of the
operation.

Secrecy in Transit

The Soviet ships made false declarations when they exited the Black Sea and the Bospo-
rus. Cargo records were altered and the tonnage declared was well below what was be-
ing carried.33 The ships would declare from Odessa, although they had loaded at other
ports. Often ships going to Cuba listed Conakry, Guinea, as their destination. When the
volume of traffic increased, a number of ships did not give their destinations but simply
stated that they were carrying “general cargo” and “awaiting orders.”34

Transit through the Bosporus and the Dardanelles Straits presented a special chal-
lenge. Not only were the soldiers kept below decks, but the captains were under orders
to prevent any foreigners from boarding, even the Turkish pilots who usually guided
civilian ships through those tricky waters. Whenever the pilots approached the Soviet
ships, the Soviet crews would lower bulging parcels of vodka, brandy, caviar, sausages,
and other delicacies. Gribkov noted that this transparent bribery worked well: “Every-
one likes to get presents, even pilots.”35

The captains were instructed to take all possible evasive action in the event of at-
tacks or an effort to board their ships. Should evasive action fail, they were to “destroy
all documents with state and military secrets,” take measures to protect the personnel,
and sink the ships.36 Should their vessels experience mechanical failure en route, the
captains were to explain to ships offering assistance that they were exporting automo-
biles.37 Had this occurred, it might have provided clues—the USSR had few cars of any
kind and was not recognized as an automobile exporter.

Moscow also resorted to diplomatic means to reduce US reconnaissance of the ships
en route. In July 1962, the Soviets described US reconnaissance missions in interna-
tional waters as “harassment,” and requested through their GRU officer in Washington,
Col. Georgi Bolshakov, that these flights be stopped for the sake of better bilateral rela-
tions.38 In retrospect, this overture clearly appears to have been an effort by Khrushchev
to delay the discovery of weapons related to Operation ANADYR. Bolshakov met with
Attorney General Robert Kennedy more than a dozen times.

Most of the voyages lasted from 18 to 20 days. Due to strict maskirovka measures,
the troops were kept below decks except for a few minutes at night when small groups
were allowed to exercise and get some fresh air.39 During the tropical days, heavy tar-
paulins covered the hatches to the lower decks where the troops were berthed. With
little air circulation, the inside temperature climbed to 120 degrees Fahrenheit or higher.
Rations were issued twice a day and only in darkness.40 Many of the troops on board
swore that they would never again set foot on a ship.

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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

256 The Art and Science of Military Deception

Although the restrictions made conditions on board nightmarish, the deceptions
worked. Gen. Gribkov states that “US intelligence discovered neither the true signifi-
cance of the surge in Soviet shipping to Cuba nor the mission of our troops on the island
until nearly all the men had come ashore and, still moving in large numbers only by
night, had been deployed to their assigned positions.”41

Unloading in Cuba

As the Soviet troops arrived, Cuban officials took steps to support Moscow’s maskirovka
plan. In early fall, they began to exert control over the movements of all foreigners on
the island. News reporters and foreign embassy personnel were forbidden to travel out-
side Havana. In the city, Cuban agents surveilled and harassed foreigners, especially
British embassy officials.42

The planners had selected 11 Cuban ports to receive the Soviet ships: Havana,
Mariel, Cabanas, Bahia Honda, Matanzas, La Isabella, Nuevitas, Nicaro, Casilda,
Cienfuegos, and Santiago de Cuba.43 They earmarked three of them—Bahia Honda and
Mariel on the northwest coast and Casilda on the south coast—to receive the surface-
to-surface missiles and nuclear warheads.44

Even before the Soviet ships approached Cuban ports, a number of maskirovka
precautions had been implemented. At Mariel, for example, the Soviets built a large
cinder-block wall around the unloading area so that none of the port activity could be
observed by land-based agents.45 As the ships lay in port, KGB officers kept watch on
deck. All Cubans, even militiamen, were barred from the port areas.46 Local inhabitants
within a mile of the waterfront in Mariel had to evacuate their homes.47

The first SS-4 missiles arrived in Mariel on board the Omsk on 8 September. The In-
digirka brought the initial shipment of nuclear warheads on 4 October.48 According to
one source, this ship carried 99 nuclear charges—some two-thirds of all nuclear weap-
ons sent to Cuba and over 20 times the explosive power dropped by all Allied bombers
on Germany throughout World War II.49

Most of the military technicians also came ashore at Mariel. Deception activities
throughout the transit stage and the strict security measures at Mariel hindered the
ability of US intelligence agencies to estimate the number of Soviet troops. The plan
for ANADYR that was approved in early July had called for moving 50,874 men. That
total included personnel for field hospitals, bakeries, mechanical workshops, and other
support units, all with a three-month supply of food and fuel. During September, the
plan was revised to eliminate submarine and surface ship squadrons, due to potential
resupply problems and concerns that their presence might sound an alarm bell in Wash-
ington. By late October, the size of the contingent in Cuba had reached about 41,900
personnel—quadruple the size that US intelligence agencies figured.50

Nonetheless, in the hectic initial days in Cuba, secrecy created more than a few
glitches. The General Staff had neglected to provide passwords to facilitate communica-
tion between the arriving transport ships and the Cuban greeting parties. Accordingly,
some ship captains and on-board troop commanders had difficulty accepting orders to
reroute their ships from their originally assigned ports. The captain of one ship even
turned back out to sea rather than allow a Cuban patrol boat crew to come aboard to
guide him to his anchorage.51

Usually two or three days were required to unload a ship with military cargo, and
maskirovka requirements invariably complicated the work. Equipment that had at least

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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

The Art and Science of Military Deception 257

a superficial resemblance to agricultural machinery was unloaded in broad daylight,
but weapons and other military equipment could be unloaded only at night. From the
docks, specialized equipment was stored in sheds or moved directly to designated bases
along back roads at night.52

All this time, Radio Moscow was claiming that the USSR was only giving Cuba
“machine tools, wheat, and agricultural machinery,” along with “some 7,000 tons of
various fertilizers.”53 This description was consistent with the false identities provided
to many of the Soviet military specialists and also with the daytime unloading activity.

Movement to Field Sites

The maskirovka measures were not air tight. In the initial stages of the operation, the
United States received reports from friendly nations, newspaper correspondents, and
other sources indicating that hundreds of Russian troops in fatigues had been seen in
Havana and in seemingly endless convoys along Cuba’s main highways. Many young
Russian men also had been observed sightseeing in the Cuban capital in checked, cotton
shirts and cheap trousers.54 Although the Soviets and Cubans took extra precautions to
keep gawkers away from the wharves and moved the nuclear cargoes away under black
canvas and escorted by heavy guard, the chatty Cubans gave a steady stream of clues to
US SIGINT collectors.55

At the same time, the Soviets and Cubans mounted a major campaign using HU-
MINT channels to bolster the overall deception effort. The planners leaked accurate
information about the deployment so as to mask it. The information was funneled
through counterrevolutionary organizations and their press in the United States, espe-
cially in Miami. The CIA discounted the information, because it did not consider the
groups and people peddling it to be credible. This strategy was highly effective, accord-
ing to a former Cuban intelligence officer.56

The deception campaign that exploited the émigrés’ lack of credibility was unwit-
tingly backstopped by correspondence between Cubans and their friends and relatives
in the United States. From June to September, Cuban intelligence intercepted some
17,000 letters that had something to say about the deployment of Soviet troops and
missiles in Cuba. In late September, Cuban authorities permitted those letters to arrive
in Miami as part of the deception campaign. Just as Havana expected, the CIA paid no
attention to these letters.57

For US intelligence analysts, the amount of “noise” from Cuba grew deafening.
Reports flooded in from Cubans, tourists, foreign diplomats in Cuba, and newspaper
officials reporting in a private capacity. At the CIA focal point at Opa-Locka, Florida,
intelligence officers screened countless reports and debriefed Cubans who had fled the
island.58 Most of the reports from Cuba were exaggerated or imaginary—some were so
outrageous that they were laughable and made all the others suspect. There were far-
fetched tales of African troops with rings in their noses, lurking Mongolians, and even
Chinese troops. These accounts followed earlier erroneous reports of Soviet military
equipment secreted away in caves, underground hangers, and concrete domes. The pre-
vious reports had cast doubt on the reliability of sources, so US analysts found it easy to
dismiss the stream of reports of Soviet missiles.59

From the port areas, the canvas-covered SS-4 missiles were moved in night convoys,
under tight security, to sites in the interior of the island. Security was tightened so that
the troops disembarked dressed as civilians, and their escorts—Soviet personnel who

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Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis—Learning from the Past

258 The Art and Science of Military Deception

had arrived earlier—were required to wear Cuban military uniforms and issue com-
mands along the convoy routes only in Spanish.60 On the march or bivouacked, Soviet
military men remained dressed in civilian clothing and were forbidden to mention their
military designations or the ranks of their commanders. Moreover, all communications
between the Soviet military headquarters in Havana and units in the field had to be
made in person, not written or sent by radio. Except for very brief hookups and equip-
ment tests, Soviet troops maintained total radio silence in order to mask their identity,
location, and troop strength from US intelligence.61

In retrospect, some Soviet and Cuban officials found it remarkable that the opera-
tion remained secret for a full month after the missiles arrived in Cuba.62 The missile
carriers were too big to go unnoticed on the back roads of the island for long. As they
rumbled through the little Cuban towns, they left a trail of downed telephone poles
and mailboxes. When a peasant’s shack had to be moved or knocked down to allow a
missile carrier to turn a tight corner, those who witnessed the event were bound to talk.
Soviet and Cuban efforts to discredit such anecdotal accounts paid off.

Disingenuous Diplomacy

Soviet spokesmen kept up a steady stream of denials and disinformation in September.
On 4 September, Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin sought out Robert Kennedy and stated
that he had received instructions from Khrushchev to assure the President that there
would be no surface-to-surface missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. Dobrynin
also added that the Attorney General could assure his brother that the Soviet military
buildup was not of any significance.63 On 6 September, Theodore Sorenson, special
counsel to President Kennedy, met with Dobrynin, who reiterated his assurances that
Soviet military assistance to Cuba was strictly defensive in nature and did not represent a
threat to American security. The following day, Dobrynin assured US Ambassador to the
United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the USSR was supplying only defensive weapons to
Cuba. On 11 September, TASS announced that the USSR neither needed nor intended to
introduce offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba.64

In late September, Khrushchev embarked on a barnstorming tour in the Turkmen
and Uzbek republics. This high-profile trip, which extended into the first week of Octo-
ber, emphasized agricultural themes. In none of Khrushchev’s many speeches during his
travels was there any reference suggesting aggression or threats to the United States.65

The pattern continued. On 13 October, a high State Department official, Chester
Bowles, questioned Dobrynin on whether Moscow intended to put offensive weap-
ons in Cuba; the Ambassador denied any …