KeohaneNye_RealismandComplexInterdependence.pdf

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R e a l i s m a n d C o m p l e x I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e

Robert O.Keohane ondlosePh S. Nye

In this classic work, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye offer a neoliberal cri-
tique of the realist worldview. They assert that in the post-Wot’ld War II era
countries have become more and more intertwined economically. The
explosive growth in the size and number of transnational corporations has
blurred state boundaries, rendering traditional realist assumptions about
the centrality of the state questionable. Realists contend that the state is the
dominant actor in world politics and that military force and violence are
the primary means by which states achieve their goals. Keohane and Nye
p ro p o s e an al t e r nat iv e ide al ty p e—-c o mp I e x i nt e rde p e nde nc e-t hat e mp ha –
sizes cooperation rather than conflict. While the authors caution that vio-
lence and conflict have not disappeared, they point to the growing impor-
t a n c e o f n o n – s e c u r i t y – r e l a t e d i s s u e s s u c h a s i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e t a r y
relations and global environmental concerns. To them the day-to-day
affairs of states have more to do with promoting cooperative economic
interactions than with military and security matters.

One’s assumptions about world politics profoundly affect what one sees
and how one constructs theories to explain events. We believe that the
assumptions of political realists, whose theories dominated the postwar
period, are often an inadequate basis for analyzing the politics of interde-
pendence. The realist assumptions about world politics can be seen as
defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type. One could also imagine
very different conditions. In this chapter, we shall construct another ideal

R e p r i n t e d w i t h p e r m i s s i o n o f t h e p u b l i s h e r f r o m P o w e r a n d I n t e r d e p e n d e n c e :
World Politics inTr”ansition,2d edition, by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye
rGlenview, IL: Pearson Education, Inc.). Copyright O 1989 by Robert O. Keohane
a n d J o s e p h S . N y e , p p . 2 3 – 2 5 ; 2 9 – 3 7 .

49

50 ContendingYiewsoflPE

type, the opposite of realism. We call t complex interdependence’ After

esiablishing ih” diff”.”n”es between realism and complex interdependence,
we shall argue that complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to

reality than does realism. when it does, traditional explanations of change
in iniernational regimes become questionable and the search for new

explanatory models becomes more urgent.’
For politlcal realists, international politics, like all other politics, is a

struggle io. po*”. but, unlike domestic politics, a struggle dominated by

organlred violence. . . . Three assumptions are integral to the realist vision.
Fiist, states as coherent units are the dominant actors in world politics. This

is a double assumption: states are predominant; and they act as coherent
units. Second, realists assume that force is a usable and effective instrument
of policy. Other instruments may also be employed, but using or threaten-
ing force is the most effective means of wielding power’ Third’ partly

beiause of their second assumption, realists assume a hierarchy of issues in

world politics, headed by questions of military security: the “high politics”

of military security dominates the “low politics” of economic and social

affairs.
These realist assumptions define an ideal type of world politics. They

allow us to imagine a world in which politics is continually characterized
by active or potential conflict among states, with the use of force possible

ai a.ry time.
-Each

state attempts to defend its territory and interests from
real or perceived threats. Political integration among states is slight and

lasts only as long as it serves the national interests of the most powerful
states. Tiansnational actors either do not exist or are politically unimpor-
tant. Only the adept exercise of force or the threat of force permits states to
survive, and only while statesmen succeed in adjusting their interests’ as in

a well-functioning balance of power’ is the system stable’
Each of the realist assumptions can be challenged. If we challenge

them all simultaneously, we can imagine a world in which actors other than

stares participate directly in world politics, in which a clear hierarchy of

issues does not exist, and in which force is an ineffective instrument of pol-

icy. Under these conditions-which we call the characteristics of complex
inierdependence-one would expect world politics to be very different than
under realist conditions.

The Characteristics of Complex lnterdependence

Complex interdependqnce has three main characteristics:

1 . M u l t i p t e c h a n n e l s c o n n e c t s o c i e t i e s , i n c l u d i n g : i n f o r m a l t i e s

between governmental elites as well as formal foreign office arrangements;
informal ties among nongovernmental elites (face-to-face and through
telecommunications); and transnational organizations (such as multination-

Robert O. Keohone &Joseph S. Nye 5 |

al banks or corporations). These channels can be summarized as interstate,
Iransgovernmental, and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the
normal channels assumed by realists. Transgovernmental applies when we
relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational
rpplies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units.

2. The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that
.rre not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of’hierar-
.-ht among isszes means, among other things, that military security does
rot consistently dominate the agenda. Many issues arise from what used to
:e considered domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and
:oreign issues becomes blurred. These issues are considered in several gov-
:rnment departments (not just foreign offices), and at several levels.
Inadequate policy coordination on these issues involves significant costs.
Different issues generate different coalitions, both within governments and
icross them, and involve different degrees of conflict. Politics does not stop
ii the waters’edge.

3. Military force is not used by governments toward other governments
.i ithin the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails.
-: may, however, be important in these govemments’relations with govern-
rents outside that region, or on other issues. Military force could, for
:rstance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues

:rriong members of an alliance, yet at the same time be very important for
::at alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc. For the for-
:er relationships this condition of complex interdependence would be met;
‘rr the latter, it would not.

Traditional theories of international politics implicitly or explicitly
::ny the accuracy of these three assumptions. Traditionalists are therefore
‘:mpted also to deny the relevance of criticisms based on the complex
:rerdependence ideal type. We believe, however, that our three conditions
::: fairly well approximated on some global issues of economic and eco-
.,sical interdependence and that they come close to characterizing the

::.tire relationship between some countries. One of our purposes here is to
::.x’e that contention. In fPower and Interdependence: World Politics in
-‘tnsition we] examine complex interdependence in oceans policy and

–
rnetary policy and in the relationships of the United States to Canada and

:-::tralia. In this chapter, however, we shall try to convince you to take
.-:’e criticisms of traditional assumptions seriously. . . .

The Political Processes of Complex lnterdependence

–3 three main characteristics of complex interdependence give rise to dis-
:tive political processes, which translate power resources into power as

– :.trol of outcomes. As we argued earlier, something is usually lost or

52 ContendingViewsoflpE

added in the translation. Under condidortranslation will be different than under l::|”:”^T’Px
interdependence the

rions abour ourcomes wlrneed,”;;;d”,:,j’#:1fiff;:, and our predic_
I n t h e r e a l i s r w o r r d , . r i u r ” . t . . . i r i t y w i r t b e t h e d o m i n a n t g o a l o f

;fi? :::ffJr? “rrect
issues

‘r'”i”‘” ‘”, directlv inuoru’J *i,h mlitary
dinared to ,n’iruJl tt”lt::

Nonmilitary.probrems will not onry be subor_imprications. ;;;i”31i;:lflJliffJ,’ *il:’,r'”i” p”iiiil”-mlitaryat least as much n *’. ruii’^i;::: i:i::’ Ior rnstance, will be consideredu, r- tn”i, f ;;;l;’r’ff”:i”1′;l’,?ijl;Tfji”u’ion”io,’Lro;;J generary
In a world oforricia,s,d;;;;Ti:nli”.”H:lJl”l’Ji;,1,J,;::”:::*”:l:,^::;Hi:

that must be pursued’ rn the
“or”rr* “t'” crear hierarct y or ir*”r, gout,

;JllJffi:lil::,
and mav ‘o, b; ;;; rerated. Each bureaucracy w’rmjseson,,,””,-*,,”#i.? jfl “Tr”:ilHHi,;i:ffi *J*i,”ffiHJ;of policy is difficult.to,nuinruin.ilo;;”r,

rransnarional actors will inrro_d uce differen r goal s i nto uuri ;r’ g;; ;;”r;; r,
“”r.

Linkage Strategies

Goals will therefore vary by issue area undeso will the distribution or o”;;;;’ilrcomplex
interdependence, butrradirionar *af,i, .ro”u,”, in ;; il#illi:XiH: Tt,H::T:1:

::d”ffLi,rl’,fl #:[::l’ff Tffi “;J:::r.;l;*oi,i,on,,-o;l*,ilffi’J;; ji:’*:g;’$””;’1″””1i’i’J'”1#'””1iff :’:T:lf “:o n th eir, ” J ;; ;,:”1iiT’i'”,:’:’:lf, iiT, i::fl#H:ffi ;l l*kiensure a congruence between the overat structure of military and economicil3ryifi:,HlT’i3:i#i::ffi ‘n -‘ *” i,,u” u,”u ri”,’i””,i. 0″,,-
_

Under complex interdependence, suchoccur. As mlitary rorce is a”uaru”o,,_il;;j,T:** il:j”T,ii-r:lr. i:more difficuh to use their overall o”-ir”””” a control outcomes on issuesin which rhey are weak. And ri”* ii”‘o#ibution of power resources intrade, shipping, or ol,_fo,”-;;;i;;;”rii’o’r,” differenr, paterns of out_,”r”rT””J ,Tij;il,ff,ile political p-“”G “.””i,*o, . “”.v i.lni on”.r”, orwe re rh e h i gh e s, “;;’ ;i.ilrffi Ji 1’#i:llll,11i;,T ilIl l’#iff :,ll’gof power would not
‘iutt”,

very much. The tinkages drawn from them romilitary issues would ensure consistent dominance by the overalr strongest

Robert O. Keohone &/oseph S. Nye 53

‘:’lres. But when miritary-Jorce is largery immobilized, strong states willr rd rhat linkage is less effective. They may stiil artempr suchlinks, but ine absence of a hierarchy of issues, their success wiil be problematic..
Dominant states may try to secure much the ,un-‘”.”rult by using over-

‘” economic power to affect results on other issues. If only
“.ono,ni.:tectives are at stake, they may succeed: money, after all, is fungible. But::’rnomic objectives have political imprications, and economic linkage byl strong is limited by domestic, transnational, and transgovernmental

–:ors who resist having their interests traded off. Furthermor-e. the interna-
. nal actors may be different on different issues, and the internatronar
::anizations in which negotiations take prace are often quite separate.–.-rs it is difficult, for example, to imagine a militarily or economically’:rn-g state linking concessions on monetary policy to reciprocal conces-

rs in oceans policy. on the other hand, poo.*.ui states are not similar_
rnhibited from linking unrerated issues, partry because their domestrc-:3rests are less complex. Linkage of unrelated issues is often a means of: ::rcting concessions or side payments from rich and powerful states. And

“-.:ke powerful states whose instrument for linkage (military force) is’ 3n too costly to use, the linkage instrument used by poo., ,”uk states_- :national organization_is available and inexpensive.
Thus as the utility of force declines, and as issues become more equal- -:xportance, the distribution of power within each issue will become* :3 lmportant. If linkages become less effective on the whole, outcomes

: rlitical bargaining will increasingly vary by issue area.
The differentiation among issue areas in complex interdependence–::rs thot linkages among issues will become more problematic and will: – r ro reduce rather than reinforce international hieraichy. Linkage strate_

– : ‘ ‘ a n d d e f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e m , w i l l p o s e c r i t i c a l s t r a i e g i c c h J i c e s f o r
-‘” Should issues be.considered separately or as a package? If linkages

– -: r be drawn, which issues should be linked, and on which of the linked
-:’ should concessions be made? How far can one push a linkage befbre-:-trrres counterproductive? For instance, should one seek form-al agree_”:-r’ or informal, but less poritically sensitive, understandings? The fact”-“‘iorld politics under complex interdependence is not a sJamless web

–‘us to expect that efforts to stitch seams together advantageously, as-:::ed in linkage strategies, will, very often, determine the siape of the

leenda Setting

‘- ‘:–ond assumption of comprex interdependence, the lack of clear hier–. :rron-g multiple issues, leads us to expect that the politics of agenda

54 ContendingViews of IPE

formation and control will become more important. Traditional analyses
lead statesmen to focus on politico-military issues and to pay little attention
to the broader politics of agenda formation. Statesmen assume that the
agenda will be set by shifts in the balance of power, actual or anticipated,
and by perceived threats to the security of states. Other issues will only be
very important when they seem to affect security and military power. In
these cases, agendas will be influenced strongly by considerations of the
overall balance of power.

Yet, today, some nonmilitary issues are emphasized in interstate rela-
tions at one time, whereas others of seemingly equal importance are neg-
lected or quietly handled at a technical level. Intemational monetary poli-
tics, problems of commodity terms of trade, oil, food, and multinational
corporations have all been important during the last decade; but not all
have been high on interstate agendas throughout that period.

Traditional analysts of international politics have paid little attention
to agenda formation: to how issues come to receive sustained attention by
high officials. The traditional orientation toward military and security
affairs implies that the crucial problems of foreign policy are imposed on
states by the actions or threats of other states. These are high politics as
opposed to the low politics of economic affairs. Yet, as the complexity of
actors and issues in world politics increases, the utility of force declines
and the line between domestic policy and foreign policy becomes blurred:
as the conditions of complex interdependence are more closely approxi-
mated, the politics of agenda formation becomes more subtle and differen-
tiated.

Under complex interdependence we can expect the agenda to be
affected by the international and domestic problems created by economic
growth and increasing sensitivity interdependence. . Discontented
domestic groups will politicize issues and force more issues once consid-
ered domestic onto the interstate agenda. Shifts in the distribution of
power resources within sets of issues will also affect agendas. During the
early 1970s the increased power of oil-producing governments over the
t r a n s n a t i o n a l c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d t h e c o n s u m e r c o u n t r i e s d r a m a t i c a l l y
altered the policy agenda. Moreover, agendas for one group of issues
may change as a result of linkages from other groups in which power
resources are changing; for example, the broader agenda of North-South
trade issues changed after the OPEC price rises and the oil embargo of
1973-74. Even if capabilities among states do not change, agendas may
be affected by shifts in the importance of transnational actors. The pub-
licity surrounding multinational corporations in the early 1970s, coupled
with their rapiil growth over the past twenty years, put the regulation of
such corporations higher on both the United Nations agenda and national
agendas.

Robert O. Keohone &Joseph S. Nye 55

Tran s national and Tran sgove rn m ental Relati on s

.’-: :hird condition of complex interdependence, multiple channels of con-
,,-: rmong societies, further blurs the distinction between domestic and
-:::rational politics. The availability of partners in political coalitions is
‘ . r e c e s s a r i l y l i m i t e d b y n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s a s t r a d i t i o n a l a n a l y s i s
-‘- -:nes. The nearer a situation is to complex interdependence, the more we
: ‘:e–t the outcomes of political bargaining to be affected by transnational
-: :tit1rlS. Multinational corporations may be significant both as independent
;ui r,ri &fld as instruments manipulated by governments. The attitudes and
:, — stands of domestic groups are likely to be affected by communica-
: .–. organized or not, between them and their counterparts abroad.

Thus the existence of multiple channels of contact leads us to expect
-.:.. beyond those normally found in domestic politics, on the ability of

::ri:rn€n to calculate the manipulation of interdependence or follow a con-
.::rt strategy of linkage. Statesmen must consider differential as well as

–::3gate effects of interdependence strategies and their likely implications
– :r-rliticization and agenda control. Transactions among societies-eco-

-, .:-i,- and social transactions more than security ones-affect groups differ-
:-:.’.. Qppeltunities and costs from increased transnational ties may be
:-::i3r for certain groups-for instance, American workers in the textile or
,-, e industries-than for others. Some organizations or groups may interact
: :::tlv with actors in other societies or with other governments to increase
:,..: benefits from a network of interaction. Some actors may therefore be
.:’- rulnerable as well as less sensitive to changes elsewhere in the network
r;r .lr€ others, and this will affect patterns of political action.

The multiple channels of contact found in complex interdependence
:i: rr-rt limited to nongovernmental actors. Contacts between governmental
-‘-::rucracies charged with similar tasks may not only alter their perspec-

:: but lead to transgovernmental coalitions on particular policy ques-
r.’. To improve their chances of success, govemment agencies attempt to

‘ – : – i a c t o r s f r o m o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t s i n t o t h e i r o w n d e c i s i o n – m a k i n g
:r.rsrses as allies. Agencies of powerful states such as the United States
:;. i used such coalitions to penetrate weaker governments in such coun-
:-:i irs Turkey and Chile. They have also been used to help agencies of
r–“:f governments penetrate the United States bureaucracy.l . . .

The existence of transgovernmental policy networks leads to a differ-
:- :nterpretation of one of the standard propositions about international
:, -:1!-s-that states act in their own interest. Under complex interdepend-
:–:. this conventional wisdom begs two important questions: which self
.- : ‘* hich interest? A government agency may pursue its own interests
–:rr the guise of the national interest; and recurrent interactions can
–.1S€ official perceptions oftheir interests. . . .

56 ContendingViewsoflPE

The ambiguity of the national interest raises serious problems for the
top political leaders of governments. As bureaucracies contact each other
directly across national borders (without going through foreign offices),
centralized control becomes more difficult. There is less assurance that the
state will be united when dealing with foreign governments or that its com-
ponents will interpret national interests similarly when negotiating with
foreigners. The state may prove to be multifaceted, even schizophrenic.
National interests will be defined differently on different issues, at different
times, and by different governmental units. States that are better placed to
maintain their coherence (because of a centralized political tradition such
as France’s) will be better able to manipulate uneven interdependence than
fragmented states that at first glance seem to have more resources in an
issue area.

Role of lnternational Organizations

Finally, the existence of multiple channels leads one to predict a different
and significant role for international organizations in world politics.
Realists in the tradition of Hans J. Morgenthau have portrayed a world in
which states, acting from self-interest, struggle for “power and peace.”
Security issues are dominant; war threatens. In such a world, one may
assume that international institutions will have a minor role, limited by the
rare congruence of such interests. International organizations are then
clearly peripheral to world politics. But in a world of multiple issues imper-
fectly linked, in which coalitions are formed transnationally and transgov-
emmentally, the potential role of intemational institutions in political bar-
gaining is greatly increased. In particular, they help set the international
agenda, and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for politi-
cal initiatives and linkage by weak states.

Governments must organize themselves to cope with the flow of busi-
ness generated by international organizations. By defining the salient issues,
and deciding which issues can be grouped together, organizations may help
to determine governmental priorities and the nature of interdepartmental
committees and other arrangements within governments. The 1972
Stockholm Environment Conference strengthened the position of environ-
mental agencies in various governments . The 197 4 World Food Conference
focused the attention of important parts of the United States govemment on
prevention of food shortages. The September 1975 United Nations special
session on proposa]s for a New International Economic Order generated an
intragovernmental debate about policies toward the Third World in general.
The Intemational Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade have focused govemmental activity on money and trade instead of on

Robert O. Keohane &JosePh S. NYe 57

Table 4. I Political Processes Under Conditions of Realism and Complex
Interdependence

Realism Complex Interdependence

Goals of actors

Instruments of
state policy

Asenda formation

Linkages of issues

Roles of
intemational
organizations

Military security will be the
dominant goal.

Military force will be most
effective, although economic
and other instruments will also
be used.

Potential shifts in the balance
of power and security threats
will set the agenda in high
politics and will stronglY
influence other agendas.

Linkages will reduce
differences in outcomes
among issue areas and
reinforce intemational hierarchy.

Roles are minor, limited by
state power and the importance
of military force.

Goals of states will vary bY
issue area. Transgovemmental
politics will make goals difficult
to define. Transnational actors
will pursue their own goals.

Power resources specific
to issue areas will be most
relevant. Manipulation of
interdependence. intemational
organizations. and transnational
actors will be major instruments.

Agenda will be affected by
changes in the distribution of
power resources within issue
areas; the status of intemational
regimes; changes in the
importance of transnational
actors; linkages from other
issues and politicization as a
result of rising sensitivity
interdependence.

Linkages by strong states will
be more difficult to make since
force will be ineffective.
Linkages by weak states
through intemational
organizations will erode rather
than reinforce hierarchy.

Organizations will set agendas,
induce coalition-formation, and
act as arenas for political action
by weak states. Ability to
choose the organizational
forum for an issue and to
mobilize votes will be an
important political resource.

private direct investment, which has no comparable international orgailza-
tion.

By bringing officials together, international organizations help to acti-
vate potential coalitions in world politics. It is quite obvious that interna-
tional organizations have been very impofiant in bringing together repre-
sentatives of less developed countries, most of which do not maintain

58 ContendingViewsoflPE

embassies in one another’s capitals. Third World strategies of solidarity
among poor countries have been developed in and for a series of interna-
tional conferences, mostly under the auspices of the United Nations.2
International organizations also allow agencies of governments, which
might not otherwise come into contact, to tum potential or tacit coalitions
into explicit transgovernmental coalitions characterized by direct commu-
nications. In some cases, international secretariats deliberately promote this
process by forming coalitions with groups of governments, or with units of
governments, as well as with nongovemmental organizations having simi-
lar interests.3

International organizations are frequently congenial institutions for
weak states. The one-state-one-vote norm of the United Nations system
favors coalitions of the small and powerless. Secretariats are often respon-
sive to Third World demands. Furthermore, the substantive norms of most
international organizations, as they have developed over the years, stress
social and economic equity as well as the equality of states. Past resolu-
tions expressing Third World positions, sometimes agreed to with reserva-
tions by industrialized countries, are used to legitimize other demands.
These agreements are rarely binding, but up to a point the norms of the
institution make opposition look more harshly self-interested and less
defensible. . . .

Complex interdependence therefore yields different political pattems
than does the realist conception of the world. (Table 4.1 summarizes these
differences.) Thus, one would expect traditional theories to fail to explain
international regime change in situations of complex interdependence. But,
for a situation that approximates realist conditions, traditional theories
should be appropriate. . . .

Notes

I . For a more detailed discussion, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’
Jr., “Transgovernmental Relations and Intemational Organizati ons,” Wor ld P olit ic s
27, no. | (October 197 4): 39-62.

2. Branislav Gosovic and John Gerard Ruggie, “On the Creation of a New
International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh Special Session of
the UN General Assembly,” International Organization 30, no. 2 (Spring 1976):
30946.

3. Robert W. Cox, “The Executive Head,” International Organization 23, no’
2 (Spring 1969): 205-30.