Review

1 The N
eed for Theory

It is sheer craziness to dare to understand
w

orld affairs. T
here are so

m
any collective actors-states,

international
organizations,

transna-
tional

associations, social m
ovem

ents,
and subnational

groups-and
billions of individuals, each w

ith different histories, capabilities, and
goals, interacting

to create historical patterns that are at all tim
es sus-

ceptible to change. Put m
ore sim

ply, w
orld affairs are pervaded w

ith
endless details-far

m
ore than one can hope to com

prehend
in their

entirety.
A

nd if these m
yriad details seem

overw
helm

ing during relatively sta-
ble periods, they seem

that m
uch m

ore confounding
at those tim

es
w

hen dynam
ism

and change becom
e predom

inant.
Such is the case as

the tw
entieth

century draw
s to a close. In all parts of the w

orld, long-
established

traditions,
institutions,

and relationships
are undergoing

profound
and

bew
ildering

transform
ations.

Indeed,
the

pace
of

change has been so rapid, w
ith the collapse of the Soviet U

nion follow
–

ing so soon after the end of the C
old W

ar-to
m

ention only the m
ost

dram
atic

of the changes that have cascaded across the global land-
scape-that

it becom
es reasonable

to assert that change is the only
constant in w

orld affairs.
A

nd w
e dare to think w

e can m
ake sense of this com

plex, sw
ift-m

ov-
ing w

orld, w
ith its w

elter of details, intricate relationships, m
ushroom

–
ing conflicts, and m

om
ents of cooperation!

H
ow

nervy! H
ow

utterly
absurd! W

hat sheer craziness!
B

ut the alternatives
to seeking com

prehension
are too noxious

to
contem

plate,
ranging as they do from

resorting to sim
plistic and ideo-

logical interpretations
to being propelled by forces w

e can neither dis-
cern nor influence. So dare w

e m
ust! H

ow
ever far-fetched and arrogant

it m
ay seem

, w
e have no choice as concerned

persons but to seek to 1

2
The N

eed for Theory

fathom

the m
eaning

and
im

plications
of the

events
and

stunning
changes that bom

bard us from
every corner of the w

orld.
H

appily, there are at least tw
o handy m

echanism
s

available for eas-
ing the task. O

ne involves a sense of hum
ility. If w

e can rem
ain in aw

e
of the com

plexities
and changes at w

ork in the w
orld, ever ready to

concede confusion
and alw

ays rem
inding

ourselves that our conclu-
sions m

ust perforce be tentative, then it should be possible to avoid ex-
cessive sim

plicity and intellectual
paralysis. Second, and m

uch m
ore

im
portant,

w
e can self-consciously rely on the core practices of theory

to assist us in bringing
a m

easure of order out of the seem
ing chaos

that confronts us. For it is through theorizing that w
e can hope to tease

m
eaningful

patterns
out of the endless details and inordinate

com
–

plexities that sustain w
orld politics.

M
oving U

p the L
adder of A

bstraction

B
eing self-consciously

theoretical
is not nearly as difficult as it m

ay
seem

at first glance. For inevitably w
e engage in a form

of theorizing
w

henever w
e observe w

orld affairs. It is im
possible to perceive and de-

scribe all that has occurred (or is occurring), and there is just too m
uch

detail to depict
every aspect of any situation,

m
uch

less num
erous

overlapping
situations.

Put m
ore forcefully, asking a student of w

orld
affairs to account for all the dim

ensions of an event is like asking geog-
raphers to draw

a life-sized m
ap of the w

orld. C
learly, such a m

ap could
not be draw

n (w
here w

ould they store it?); thus, one is com
pelled to

m
ake choices am

ong all the possible details that could be described, to
select som

e as im
portant

and dism
iss others as trivial for the purposes

at hand (m
uch as geographers m

ight select m
ountains

and rivers as sa-
lient and treat hills and stream

s as irrelevant). A
nd it is at the very

point w
hen one starts selecting the relevant details that one begins to

theorize. For w
e do not m

ake the selections at random
,

for no reason,
capriciously. R

ather, crude and im
precise as they m

ay be, our observa-
tions derive from

som
e notion

of w
hat is significant and w

hat is not-
distinctions that am

ount
to a form

of theory, a sorting m
echanism

that
enables us to m

ove on to the next observation.
T

o acknow
ledge that

the selection process alw
ays accom

panies
ef-

fort to develop understanding
is not, how

ever, to insure a self-con-
sciousness about theory.

It is all too tem
pting

to lapse into thinking
that the aspects of a situation

selected form
an objective reality that

The N
eed for Theory

3

any observer w
ould perceive. From

the perspective
of our unrecog-

nized theories, everything can seem
so self-evident that w

e m
ay be in-

clined to equate our-understanding
of events w

ith the “truth”
about

them
, a practice that can lead to all kinds of problem

s once w
e try to

share our understandings
w

ith others.
T

o avoid or overcom
e these difficulties, and thereby heighten

our
theoretical

sensitivities, it is useful to conceive of raw
observations-

the endless details noted
above-as

located at the low
est rung on a

huge ladder of abstraction.
O

ne then ascends the ladder each tim
e one

clusters details at a given level into a m
ore encom

passing pattern. T
he

broader the generalizations
one m

akes, of course, the higher one goes
on the ladder, stopping the ascent at that rung w

here one is satisfied
that the kind of understanding

one seeks has been achieved. In a like
m

anner, one descends the ladder w
hen one perceives that m

ore detail
is needed to clarify the understanding

developed at higher rungs.
T

he notion
of understanding

arrayed at different levels of abstrac-
tion prom

otes theoretical self-consciousness because it constantly re-
m

inds us that w
e are inescapably

involved in a process of selecting
som

e details as im
portant

and dism
issing others as trivial. A

w
are that,

perforce, w
e m

ust teeter precariously on a rung of delicately balanced
interpretations

w
henever w

e m
ove beyond raw

facts, w
e are continu-

ously im
pelled to treat any observation w

e m
ake as partly a product of

our prem
ises about the w

ay things w
ork in w

orld politics.
A

nother w
ay of developing a keen sensitivity to the im

peratives of
theorizing is to evolve a habit of alw

ays asking about any phenom
e-

non w
e observe, ,;O

f w
hat is this an instance?” T

hough brief, the ques-
tion is pow

erful because it forces us to m
ove up the ladder of abstrac-

tion in order to identify a m
ore encom

passing class of phenom
ena

of
w

hich the observed event is an instance. Suppose, for exam
ple, one is

investigating the Soviet U
nion and observes that in 1991 it underw

ent
a coup d’etat

that failed, and further suppose that
one then asks of

w
hat is this failure an instance. Im

m
ediately one com

es upon a num
–

ber of possible answ
ers at different rungs on the ladder. A

t the next
highest rung the coup attem

pt m
ay loom

as a botched pow
er grab by a

sm
all clique of politicians frustrated by their progressive loss of influ-

ence. A
t a higher rung it can be seen as an instance

of factional and
ideological tension am

ong an elite accustom
ed to unquestioned

lead-
ership. A

t a still higher rung it m
ight be interpreted

as an instance of
the kind of political tensions that follow

w
hen an econom

y enters a

4
The N

eed for Theory

period of steep decline. N
ear the top rung the failed coup can readily

be view
ed as an instance of profound

change in a long-stagnant
soci-

ety. A
t the very top it m

ight be seen as the final stage in a long process
of system

ic collapse.
In the sense that they are broadly explanatory, each of these inter-

pretations
is profoundly

theoretical.
N

one of them

is m
ore

correct
than any other-since

they offer explanations
at different levels of ag-

gregation-but
all of them

select certain aspects of the failed coup as
relevant

and im
pute

m
eaning to them

.
A

nd, in so doing, they nicely
dem

onstrate
how

the of-w
hat-is-this-an-instance

question
im

pels us
to use theory

as a m
eans of enlarging

our understanding.
M

ore than
that, the several interpretations

of the coup highlight the satisfactions
inherent

in the theoretical
enterprise.

For there is little to get excited
about at the low

est rungs on the ladder of abstraction. T
o be sure, the

raw
facts and historical details are im

portant-one
could hardly theo-

rize w
ithout

them
-but

it is only as one m
oves up the ladder that the

interesting
questions

begin to arise and allow
one’s m

ind
to com

e
alive, to probe and ponder, to delve and discard, to roam

and revise.
T

aken by itself, the failed coup in A
ugust 1991 w

as no m
ore than nine

m
en im

prisoning
a president and issuing orders; but as an instance of

m
ore encom

passing
processes, it w

as one of the m
ost dynam

ic
m

o-
m

ents of recent history.

The R
efinem

ents of Theory

It follow
s that at least crude form

s of theorizing are at w
ork w

henever
w

e undertake
observation. T

he facts of history or current events do not
speak to us. T

hey do not cry out for attention
and im

pose them
selves

upon
us. R

ather, it is w
e w

ho m
ake the facts speak, accord them

sa-

lience, give them
m

eaning,
and in so doing endlessly engage in the

theoretical enterprise. Since this is the case irrespective of w
hether w

e
are aw

are of ourselves as theoreticians,
it is obviously preferable to

m
ove consciously

up and
dow

n
the

ladder of abstraction.
Indeed,

since theorizing
is the surest and m

ost expeditious
route

to under-
standing,

there is m
uch to be said for m

aking a habit out of the of-
w

hat-is-this-an-instance
question,

of training
oneself to ask it con-

stantly in order to insure that one proceeds explicitly from
observation

to inference to explanation.
B

y being habitual about the question, that

The N
eed for Theory

5

is, one assures alw
ays seeing larger m

eanings even as one focuses on
particular

events. A
nd by being explicit, one can identify w

here one
m

ay have erred if it turns out that an interpretation
proves unw

ar-
ranted in the light of subsequent developm

ents.
E

xplicitness, in other w
ords, is a crucial refinem

ent of the theoretical
enterprise.

It is w
hat allow

s us to test and revise our theories. B
y being

explicit w
e can not only check our reasoning against further observa-

tions but also subm
it our theories to the scrutiny of those w

ho doubt
the soundness of our theorizing. In this w

ay know
ledge cum

ulates and
both

specific events and broad trends com
e into focus and pave the

w
ay for ever m

ore enriched
understanding.

T
hus is a task that m

ay
seem

like sheer craziness transform
ed

by the theorist into a challeng-
ing and rew

arding endeavor.
T

here are, of course, m
any other rules and procedures that underlie

the theoretical enterprise. T
heory is not a m

eans of giving vent to one’s
intuitions,

of random
ly asserting w

hatever pops to m
ind as a response

to the
of-w

hat-is-this-an-instance
question.

A
hunch

or im
pression

m
ay serve as an initial stim

ulus to theory building, but no observation
acquires a theoretical context until such tim

e as it is integrated into a
coherent

and m
ore encom

passing
fram

ew
ork and then

subjected to
the rigors of system

atic analysis. L
ike any other intellectual enterprise,

in other w
ords, theorizing is founded on rules-in

this case, rules for
transform

ing
raw

observations into refined hypotheses and m
eaning-

ful understandings.
In them

selves, the rules are neutral; they allow
for

w
eak theory as w

ell as pow
erful theory, for narrow

theory that explains
a lim

ited set of observations as w
ell as broad theory that purports to ac-

count
for a w

ide array of phenom
ena.

W
hatever

the
strength

and
scope of any theory, how

ever, it is unlikely to advance understanding
if it strays far from

the core rules that underlie the enterprise.

Tow
ard the H

igher R
ungs

A
lthough this is not the place to elaborate the rules to w

hich theoreti-
cians adhere, it is useful to note that the higher one m

oves up the lad-
der of abstraction, the less one w

orries about anom
alous situations and

the m
ore one focuses on patterns that reflect central tendencies. A

t the
top of the

ladder sit com
prehensive

perspectives that
organize our

overall understanding
of cause and effect. W

e all have such theories,

6
The N

eed for Theory

even if w
e are not consciously aw

are of them
. Pluralists, for exam

ple,
understand

social life to be m
oved by a variety of groups w

ith differing
agendas that m

ay nevertheless intersect. A
ny such broad perspective is

consistent w
ith several m

ore specific theories; pluralism
im

plies inter-
est-group liberalism

or “w
orld society” approaches. E

ven though such
theories require som

ew
hat

different testable hypotheses,
they are fun-

dam
entally related in that they share basic axiom

s about social and po-
litical life.

C
onsequently,

as one approaches the rungs at the top of the ladder,
one’s theories

subsum
e diverse details and becom

e all-encom
passing,

ranging across the full gam
ut of hum

an
affairs. A

t the highest rung, a
theory m

ay also be called a paradigm
or a m

odel, term
s that refer to an

integrated
set

of propositions
that

account
for

any
developm

ent
w

ithin
the purview

of the theory.’
V

irtually by definition,
therefore,

paradigm
atic

form
ulations

rest on sim
ple propositions

that subsum
e

m
any diverse form

s of activity and thus cannot be readily overturned
or em

barrassed
by exceptions

to the central tendencies
they depict.

Put differently, paradigm
s

tend to be closed system
s of thought

that
cannot be broken by the recitation of specific exam

ples that run coun-
ter to their prem

ises. A
thoroughgoing

paradigm
closes off the anom

a-
lies by resort to deeper explanations

that bring the exceptions w
ithin

the scope of its central
tendencies.

M
arxists, for exam

ple, w
ere long

able to preserve their paradigm
by treating any challenge to their theo-

retical perspective
as conditioned

by class consciousness
and thus as

explicable w
ithin the context of their core prem

ises. It follow
s that the

only w
ay one can break free of an entrapping

paradigm
is by rejecting

its core prem
ises and fram

ing new
ones that account in a different w

ay
for both the central tendencies and the anom

alies. O
nce one develops

a new
form

ulation
out of the new

prem
ises, of course, one acquires a

new
paradigm

that, in turn, is both all-encom
passing

and all-entrap-
ping.

In short, w
e inevitably bring to w

orld politics a broad paradigm
atic

perspective that enables us to infuse m
eaning into the latest develop-

m
ent. A

nd inescapably, too, w
e are bound to feel quarrelsom

e w
ith re-

spect to those w
ho rely on different paradigm

s
to explain the sam

e
events.

N
otw

ithstanding
the com

bative im
pulses induced by paradigm

atic
com

m
itm

ents
and the occasional m

om
ents

of insecurity
over being

The N
eed for Theory

7

entrapped
in a conceptual jail of one’s ow

n m
aking, the higher rungs

of the ladder serve the valuable purpose of infusing coherence into all
that w

e observe in global politics. T
he paradigm

of our choice m
ay be

excessively sim
ple and it m

ay be closed to all challenges, but it does
guide us through

the com
plexities

of an ever m
ore interdependent

w
orld. O

ur perch high on the ladder of abstraction enables us to iden-
tify key questions

and develop a perspective on how
to answ

er them
.

W
ithout

a self-conscious paradigm
atic

com
m

itm
ent,

one is destined
for endless confusion, for seeing everything as relevant and thus being
unable to tease m

eaning out of the w
elter of events, situations, trends,

and circum
stances that m

ake up international
affairs at any and every

m
om

ent
in tim

e. W
ithout a readiness to rely on the interlocking pre-

m
ises of a particular paradigm

, our efforts at understanding
w

ould be,
at best, transitory, and at w

orst they w
ould be arbitrary, filled w

ith gap-
ing holes and glaring contradictions.

In order to dem
onstrate

the virtues of clim
bing to the highest rungs

on the ladder of abstraction, as w
ell as to show

how
thoroughly

the
substance of the field is a product of the broad theories w

e em
ploy, in

the follow
ing chapters w

e present tw
o very different paradigm

s and
then

contrast
them

through

a series of case studies. T
here are, of

course, m
ore than tw

o w
ell-developed theories available for use by stu-

dents of the subject. R
ather than

attem
pting

to be exhaustive, how
–

ever, w
e have chosen to be intensive, to show

how
a theory founded

on continuity
and stability (the realism

paradigm
) yields a very differ-

ent picture of global politics than one organized around change and
fluidity (the turbulence

or postinternational
paradigm

).
In the next

tw
o chapters w

e present, respectively, these tw
o paradigm

atic perspec-
tives in broad

outline,
and in C

hapter
4 w

e com
pare

the points
at

w
hich they overlap and diverge. C

hapters 5, 6, and 7 carry the com
par-

isons into the em
pirical realm

w
ith several very different case studies-

one on the A
ntarctic T

reaty, a second on the U
nited

N
ations, and

others on m
ajor crises that m

ark recent history. T
he final chapter offers

som
e suggestions for readers w

ho w
ould like to im

prove their capaci-
ties as theorists.

It m
ust be em

phasized that in both the presentations
and the com

–
parisons w

e have sought to be fair and to avoid loading the analysis in
the direction of our ow

n preferences. Paradigm
s are not superior or in-

ferior to each other, and w
e do not w

ish to im
ply that they are. T

heir

8
The N

eed for Theory

purpose is to clarify and explain phenom
ena

in the context of underly-
ing prem

ises. H
ence they are not either right or w

rong; rather, they are
either useful or not useful depending on w

hat one w
ishes to em

phasize
and accom

plish through
system

atic inquiry. W
e hope that the ensuing

pages w
ill help readers to develop paradigm

atic
com

m
itm

ents
appro-

priate to their substantive
interests and philosophic orientations.

2 The R
ealist P

aradigm

In 1948 H
ans M

orgenthau published a rem
arkable book, P

ow
er Am

ong
N

ations. H
is aim

w
as nothing less than to expound a theory of interna-

tional relations designed to explain past and current events and sug-
gest the likely direction and shape of future relations. H

e explicitly at-
tached a label-“political

realism
” -to

his theory. Som
e of the ideas he

offered bore a resem
blance to earlier w

ritings on w
orld politics; others

have been radically changed by new
er m

em
bers of the realism

school.
T

he older w
riters did not, how

ever, share M
orgenthau’s

belief in the
value of theory. In contrast, the new

w
riters on realism

m
ost certainly

do. In this chapter w
e offer an overview

of the m
ajor claim

s that m
od-

ern realists m
ake about the nature of w

orld politics.
R

ealism
hopes to explain w

hy states behave the w
ay they do. Since

states engage in a num
ber

of behaviors w
ith considerable

regularity,
som

ething
m

ust underlie that regularity. W
hat, for instance, accounts

for w
ar and peace? W

hy do states survive or fail? T
hese are the ques-

tions central to realist theory.

R
ealism

, N
eoreallsm

, and Idealism

T
he realist approach

to w
orld politics can be traced

back as far as
T

hucydides,
the chronicler

of the ancient
Peloponnesian

W
ar, w

ho
w

rote, “T
he strong do w

hat they have the pow
er to do, the w

eak accept
w

hat
they

have
to accept.”‘

D
uring

this great ancient
w

ar, w
hich

dragged on for m
ore than a quarter century, A

thens and Sparta fought
each other on land and sea. T

hey tried to m
ake peace, but their agree-

m
ents failed to hold. T

hey sought, lost, coerced, and destroyed allies;
allies and neutrals

m
ade their

ow
n calculations

of pow
er and chose

sides.

9