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moral
philosophy
readings in

Jonathan Wolff
Blavatnik Professor of Public Policy

Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University

n
W. W. NOrtON & COm PaNy

N ew Yor k • LoN doN

moral
philosophy

readings in

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Preface xvii

Pa rt   1
Meta- Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Thomas Nagel
Right and Wrong 10
Study Questions 16

DaviD hume
Moral Distinctions Not Derived From Reason 17
Study Questions 22

RuTh BeNeDicT
Patterns of Culture 22
Study Questions 26

maRy miDgley
Trying Out One’s New Sword 26
Study Questions 31

FRieDRich NieTzsche
Beyond Good and Evil 32
Study Questions 39

vii

contents

viii ■ Contents

a. J. ayeR
A Critique of Ethics 39
Study Questions 47

J. l. mackie
Inventing Right and Wrong 47
Study Questions 55

haRRy g. FRaNkFuRT
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility 56
Study Questions 65

PlaTo
God and Morality 65
Study Questions 71

PeTeR siNgeR
Evolution and Morality 71
Study Questions 83

Pa rt   2
Normative Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
sT. Thomas aquiNas
The Natural  95
Study Questions 102

ayN RaND
The Ethics of Emergencies 102
Study Questions 108

PlaTo
What Is the Value of Justice? 108
Study Questions 116

Thomas hoBBes
The State of Nature 117
Study Questions 125

Contents ■ ix

JohN RaWls
The Original Position 125
Study Questions 132

JeRemy BeNTham
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 132
Study Questions 140

JohN sTuaRT mill
Utilitarianism 140
Study Questions 150

RoBeRT Nozick
The Experience Machine 150
Study Questions 152

immaNuel kaNT
The Categorical Imperative 152
Study Questions 160

aNNeTTe BaieR
The Need for More than Justice 160
Study Questions 172

aRisToTle
Nicomachean Ethics 172
Study Questions 183

coNFucius
Analects 183
Study Questions 188

viRgiNia helD
The Caring Person 188
Study Questions 198

JeaN- Paul saRTRe
Existentialism and Humanism 198
Study Questions 207

x ■ Contents

Pa rt   3
Applied Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
Gender equa lity 208
maRy WollsToNecRaFT
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 212
Study Questions 218

simoNe De BeauvoiR
The Second Sex 218
Study Questions 232

auDRe loRDe
Age, Race, Class, and Sex 232
Study Questions 241

loRi giRshick
Gender Policing 241
Study Questions 252

compare and contrast questions 252

Fr ee Speech a nd itS limitS 252
JohN sTuaRT mill
On Liberty of Expression 254
Study Questions 268

caThaRiNe mackiNNoN
Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech 268
Study Questions 278

gReg lukiaNoFF aND JoNaThaN haiDT
The Coddling of the American Mind 278
Study Questions 290

compare and contrast questions 290

Contents ■ xi

Sexua l mor a lity 291
lois PiNeau
Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis 293
Study Questions 306

Nicholas DixoN
Alcohol and Rape 306
Study Questions 316

coNoR kelly
Feminist Ethics: Evaluating the Hookup Culture 316
Study Questions 328

compare and contrast questions 328

a bortion 328
JuDiTh JaRvis ThomsoN
A Defense of Abortion 332
Study Questions 340

maRy aNNe WaRReN
On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion 340
Study Questions 352

DoN maRquis
Why Abortion Is Immoral 352
Study Questions 361

RosaliND huRsThouse
Virtue Theory and Abortion 361
Study Questions 370

compare and contrast questions 370

euth a naSia 371
James Rachels
Active and Passive Euthanasia 372
Study Questions 378

PhiliPPa FooT
Euthanasia 379
Study Questions 388

compare and contrast questions 388

the death pena lty 388
JohN sTuaRT mill
Speech in Defense of Capital Punishment 390
Study Questions 397

hugo aDam BeDau
How to Argue About the Death Penalty 397
Study Questions 406

compare and contrast question 406

the cr imina lization oF druGS 407
Douglas husak
Four Points About Drug Decriminalization 408
Study Questions 420

geoRge sheR
On the Decriminalization of Drugs 420
Study Questions 426

compare and contrast question 426

a nim a l r iGhtS 426
immaNuel kaNT
Duties Towards Animals 428
Study Questions 429

PeTeR siNgeR
All Animals Are Equal 429
Study Questions 435

xii ■ Contents

RogeR scRuToN
Animal Rights and Wrongs 436
Study Questions 443

compare and contrast questions 443

the en vironment 443
alDo leoPolD
The Land Ethic 445
Study Questions 457

DaRRel moelleNDoRF
Justice and Climate Change 457
Study Questions 467

compare and contrast question 467

Wa r 468
JohN RaWls
50 Years After Hiroshima 469
Study Questions 476

Thomas Nagel
War and Massacre 476
Study Questions 487

compare and contrast question 487

ter ror a nd tortur e 488
alaN DeRshoWiTz
Should the Ticking Bomb Terrorist Be Tortured? 489
Study Questions 500

michael WalzeR
Terrorism: A Critique of Excuses 501
Study Questions 511

compare and contrast question 511

Contents ■ xiii

r eSiSta nce 511
heNRy DaviD ThoReau
On Civil Disobedience 513
Study Questions 521

maRTiN luTheR kiNg JR.
Letter From Birmingham Jail 522
Study Questions 530

NelsoN maNDela
I Am Prepared to Die 530
Study Questions 540

compare and contrast questions 540

r acia l JuStice 541
W. e. B. Du Bois
The Souls of Black Folk 543
Study Questions 550

elizaBeTh aNDeRsoN
Racial Integration Remains an Imperative 550
Study Questions 564

shelBy sTeele
Affirmative Action: The Price of Preference 565
Study Questions 572

geoRge yaNcy aND JuDiTh BuTleR
Black Lives Matter 572
Study Questions 580

compare and contrast questions 581

economic JuStice 581
JohN RaWls
A Theory of Justice 583
Study Questions 590

xiv ■ Contents

RoBeRT Nozick
The Entitlement Theory of Justice 590
Study Questions 598

iRis maRioN youNg
Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice 598
Study Questions 612

compare and contrast questions 612

Wor ld hunGer a nd For eiGn a id 612
PeTeR siNgeR
Famine, Affluence, and Morality 614
Study Questions 622

DamBisa moyo
Dead Aid 622
Study Questions 626

oNoRa o’Neill
Ending World Hunger 626
Study Questions 638

compare and contrast questions 638

Credits  C- 1
Index  I- 1

Contents ■ xv

xvii

T
his book is designed to accompany my textbook An Introduction to
Moral Philosophy, also published by  W.  W.  Norton. Although they
are produced so that they can be used independently of each other,
together they provide an extensive and substantial introduction to
moral philosophy. Part 1 of this volume, Meta- Ethics, provides fuller
versions of texts discussed in An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, but

can provide only a sample of issues and texts rather than aiming to be com-
prehensive. Part 2, Normative Ethics, also provides support for An Introduc-
tion, with selections from philosophers discussed in depth there, including
Bentham, Mill, Kant, Aristotle, and their critics, but also extends the range
of sources by including philosophers such as Confucius and Sartre. Part 3,
Applied Ethics, takes the extension further by including readings on a wide
range of applied topics that are only touched on, or not covered at all, in An
Introduction.

A particular effort has been made to include pieces written by women
and people of color, and this has led to the inclusion of several readings
from writers who are not generally regarded as philosophers, such as Nelson
Mandela and the poet and radical thinker Audre Lorde. These writers have
been selected because they raise important ethical questions, even if they do
not discuss them in the standard terms of Western moral philosophy. The
readings allow us to ref lect on the nature of the central issues they raise, as
well as the boundaries of what should be studied under the heading “moral
philosophy.” Some may question their inclusion; if so, I welcome the debate.

Readings in Moral Philosophy includes introductions to each part and
section as well as study questions, which test reading comprehension, and
compare and contrast questions, which test a student’s ability to synthesize
different philosophical viewpoints. The book is also supported by a full test
bank and a coursepack of assignable quizzes and discussion prompts that

preface

xviii ■ Preface

loads into most learning management systems. Access these resources at
digital.wwnorton.com/readmoral.

This book would not exist without the efforts, encouragement, and vari-
ous methods of persuasion of a number of people, most notably Roby Har-
rington, Peter Simon, and especially Ken Barton and Michael Moss, all
at W. W. Norton. I originally conceived the project on a much more modest
level, simply to provide fuller versions of texts quoted or discussed in An
Introduction. Ken and Michael persuaded me to think on a grander scale
and conducted extensive research with instructors to identify what they
most wanted to see in a book like this. Of course it is not possible to satisfy
everyone completely, or indeed anyone, and hard choices had to be made. We
hope we have made the right ones, but very much welcome further feedback
for future editions.

It would be impossible to thank everyone who gave their opinion on the
contents of this book, but a number of people gave substantial help and
advice. I’d like to give my grateful thanks to Paul Abela, Acadia University;
Caroline  T.  Arruda, University of Texas at El Paso; Andrew  D.  Chapman,
University of Colorado, Boulder; Eric Gampel, California State University–
Chico; Don Hatcher, Baker University; Carol Hay, University of Massachu-
setts, Lowell; Rodger Jackson, Stockton University; Julie Kirsch, D’Youville
College; Michael McKeon, Barry University; Timothy J. Nulty, University of
Massachusetts, Dartmouth; Andrew Pavelich, University of Houston; Arina
Pismenny, Montclair State University; Aleksandar Pjevalica, University of
Texas at El Paso; Weaver Santaniello, Penn State University; Daniel Star,
Boston University; and Glenn Tiller, Texas A&M University Corpus Christi.

I would particularly like to thank Derek Bowman, Providence College;
Rory Kraft, York College of Pennsylvania; and Joanna Smolenski, CUNY, for
their work in preparing the test bank and coursepack.

http://www.digital.wwnorton.com/readmoral

moral
philosophy
readings in

2

T
he collection starts with a selection from Thomas Nagel’s introductory
book on philosophy What Does It All Mean? Nagel raises the funda-
mental question in moral philosophy of what it is we mean when we
say that some conduct is wrong, using examples of stealing a library
book and an umbrella in a rainstorm. It is not simply a matter of fol-
lowing rules, for not all behavior is covered by rules and some rules

are themselves wrong. Often a sense that something is wrong is related to
potential harm that could be caused to others, but suppose you just don’t
care. Does that mean you no longer have a reason to avoid wrongdoing?

Nagel considers the response that God’s punishment or love provides a
reason to avoid acting wrongly or, alternatively, that we should act well so
that others act well to us, but he points out a number of limitations to those
arguments. More promising is the idea that morality provides reasons that
apply to everyone, and therefore in considering the morality of an act such
as stealing another person’s umbrella we should ask “How would you like it
if someone did that to you?” He answers that if we find that we would resent
it, then this response shows that there is a type of universal reason not to
steal the umbrella.

P a r t   1

meta-
ethics

Part 1: Meta-Ethics ■ 3

Nagel suggests that morality requires us to adopt a general point of view,
taking everyone’s interests into account and not just our own. Nevertheless,
it would be very hard to live according to a morality in which I literally took
everyone’s interests as seriously as I take my own, for example by giving to
charity all but the bare minimum of my money. Somehow a line has to be
drawn to allow me to pursue my own interests rather than devote myself
entirely to the interests of others.

A further question is whether right and wrong are the same for everyone.
Moral customs have changed over the centuries, which may lead us to think
that moral standards should be relative to the standards of our own society.
This is the question of cultural relativism, to which we will return shortly.
Nagel comments that he finds cultural relativism very hard to believe, as it
would seem to cut off the possibility of being critical about our own society’s
moral standards.

Finally Nagel considers a challenge to morality that claims we always
act selfishly and that any apparent morally good action is done purely to
avoid guilt or to achieve the “warm glow” of self- satisfaction. But Nagel sug-
gests that we would not feel guilty or experience a warm glow unless there
were external moral standards to follow. Morality, he says, tries to appeal to
impartial motivation, even though it may sometimes give way to selfish or
personal motives.

Nagel raises numerous important issues and argues for particular posi-
tions. But he recognizes that he has not provided a definitive answer to any
of the questions raised. Therefore his discussion is a perfect springboard for
further ref lection and an excellent introduction to moral philosophy.

We move next to David Hume, who, writing in the 18th century, aims to
bring out a distinction between two ways of thinking about morality. One is
that morality is based on “reason,” the other that it is based on what he calls
“passions,” which we might now call “feelings” or perhaps “preferences”
or “desires.” Hume claims that morality is a practical matter, leading to
action, but, he also claims, reason alone cannot lead to action. He argues
that reason  reveals relations between ideas and hence concerns thought
and belief alone. In order to motivate human action, something more than
thought and belief is needed: desire. I can believe that there is a refreshing
drink in front of me, but this will not lead me to drink it unless I have a
desire to drink. Insofar as morality is a practical sphere, requiring people to
be motivated to act, then morality must be based not merely on reason but
also on desire or passion.

4 ■ Part 1: Meta-Ethics

Hume’s discussion suggests only a limited way in which we can use ideas
of reason in our thinking about action. If we desire something, then reason
can help us calculate how to achieve it. And we can sometimes use our rea-
son to discover that something we desire is possible or available (or not). But
the ultimate ends of our action cannot be criticized for being reasonable or
unreasonable, or rational or irrational. There are some things that “excite
our passions,” which is to say that we desire them, and some things that do
not. On this view, no desire is irrational, unless it is a desire for something
that will frustrate a more important desire. Similarly, Hume claims, we must
come to understand that something is morally good through the fact that it
accords with our passions, rather than because it is derived by our reason.

Hume next, in a very inf luential argument, points out that it has been
very common for writers about moral questions to move from passages that
describe some factual state of affairs to a judgment of right or wrong, with-
out making clear how that transition is made. Hume wants us to appreciate
that no statement about facts logically implies any moral judgment. On a
literal reading of the text, Hume is simply pointing out that there is often a
gap in the argument between “facts” and “values” and is criticizing other
philosophers for leaving that gap unfilled. However, Hume is often read as
suggesting that such a gap cannot be filled and that it is simply illegitimate
to move from an “is”—a statement of fact— to an “ought”—a statement of
values. And indeed this may well have been Hume’s subtle intention, raising
a very significant question of how the “is/ought gap” can be filled.

The next reading is a short extract from the anthropologist Ruth Benedict
which provides examples of cultural difference with respect to moral atti-
tudes. Benedict lists different practices regarding the taking of life, and sui-
cide, to support the claim that there are no universal values and that values
differ from culture to culture. As an anthropologist her project is to under-
stand cultures, rather than to make a philosophical argument. However, the
type of evidence that Benedict draws on is often used in arguments for the
view that there are no universal moral standards, but that moral standards
differ from culture to culture and there is no external standpoint from which
one can be judged “right” and another “wrong.” This is the view known as
cultural relativism, mentioned above in relation to Nagel, and it is certainly
encouraged, whether or not directly advocated, by Benedict’s writing.

Mary Midgley’s task is to consider the merits of the type of cultural rel-
ativism suggested by the writings of Benedict and others, which Midgley
calls “moral isolationism.” Such a view prevents us from criticizing other

cultures, for each culture’s value system is said to be relative to that particu-
lar culture and hence immune to external judgment. Midgley points out that
moral isolationism blocks praise as well as blame and makes it impossible to
learn from other cultures. Indeed, she argues that moral isolationism makes
it problematic for us even to judge our own culture, for what standards could
we use if not comparisons with other cultures?

Midgley asks us to ref lect on what is claimed to be the ancient Samurai
practice of “trying out one’s new sword” on an innocent wayfarer, who would
be sliced in half as a result. An external critic might well condemn such a
practice as barbaric. Midgley points out that one way of replying to the critic
is to explain the practice as arising within Japanese culture and even to
suggest that the wayfarer may well consent. In addition to raising the ques-
tion of whether such consent is likely, Midgley points out that even to enter
into such a discussion is to reject moral isolationism. The true isolationist
response would be that it is simply not for us to try to judge or attempt to
understand. But those tempted to say anything substantive in criticism or
justification are applying one set of values (their own) to try to justify other
practices. Moral isolationism turns out to be a very difficult theory to live by,
and, Midgley argues, very misguided, as any real culture has been formed by
a good number of different traditions, many from “outside,” which should
not be possible on an isolationist view.

The challenge to conventional morality begun by cultural relativism or
moral isolationism is continued in the extract of Friedrich Nietzsche’s bril-
liant but rather elusive writings. He begins by applauding the role of strong
people in human development and achievement. He moves on to a deeply par-
adoxical position: that refraining from injuring, exploiting, and being violent
to others, which is normally thought to be morally required, will lead to the
denial of morality. Life, Nietzsche says, is “will to power,” by which he means
the drive to impose one’s own goals on others, even at their expense. There-
fore, conventional morality, in curbing the will to power, is contrary to life.

Nietzsche then goes on to distinguish what he calls “master morality”
and “slave morality.” Master morality identifies the good with the aims of
the nobility or aristocracy, which attempts to separate itself from the mass.
The noble have contempt for the “cowardly” and inferior. They have the
power even to determine their own values, and although they may help the
weak, it is simply an exercise of their own power. “Good” is the exercise of
the will of the nobility, and “bad” its frustration. Slave morality, by contrast,
is the morality of “good” and “evil.” Nietzsche regards slave morality as a

Part 1: Meta-Ethics ■ 5

6 ■ Part 1: Meta-Ethics

type of agreement or conspiracy among the weak, to protect them from
the “evil” that they fear: those very people who are the masters of master
morality. Hence slave morality turns out to be a conspiracy of the weak to
protect themselves from the strong. And it is clear that Nietzsche regards
slave morality as a highly undesirable system, opposed to “life” and in urgent
need of replacement by master morality.

From Nietzsche we move to  A.  J.  Ayer’s equally radical, though more
calmly expressed, critique of ethics. Ayer’s position f lows from a more gen-
eral philosophical position known as logical positivism, which is a theory
of how statements can be meaningful. For the logical positivist, statements
are meaningful only if they meet one of two conditions concerning how they
can be tested, which Ayer calls the “criterion of verifiability.” The first is if
they can be tested by logic; the second if they can be tested by experience.

Two moral theories could meet the criterion of verifiability, according
to Ayer. These are subjectivism and utilitarianism. Subjectivism is here
defined as identifying the good with what is generally desired, and utili-
tarianism with what maximizes happiness. Ayer’s objection to both takes
the same form: It is not contradictory to say that something is good but not
desired, or good but not maximizing of happiness. Hence the good cannot
be defined as subjectivists or utilitarians do.

This failure leads to the startling conclusion that statements expressing
moral beliefs appear to be classified as meaningless, for there is no conceiv-
able test we can use to decide a moral dispute. Rather than take this path,
Ayer provides a different way of understanding moral statements as express-
ing our attitudes. To say that something is good is rather like cheering for it,
and to say it is bad is akin to booing it. Hence, on this view, moral judgments
do not aim to be true, but rather, they express our emotions. Hence the
position defended by Ayer is known as “emotivism.” And it has the further
feature that any apparent moral disagreement is just that: apparent. For it
is perfectly possible, and no contradiction, for two people to take opposed
attitudes to the same state of affairs.

In reply to the objection that his theory makes it impossible to argue
about moral questions, Ayer replies that typically moral disagreements con-
cern the background matters of fact that give rise to the moral judgment,
such as whether someone really did take something from a shop without
paying for it. When we agree on all the facts, Ayer suggests that further
moral argument is not possible and that different moral judgments simply
ref lect different emotions or attitudes toward the case.

Like Ayer, J. L. Mackie wishes to argue against the view that moral stan-
dards are in some sense objective. Unlike Mackie, however, he does not rest
his argument on a theory of meaning. Rather, he concedes that the meaning
of an ethical judgment such as “stealing is wrong” is that it states that it is an
objective fact that stealing is wrong. However, Mackie wishes to convince us
that all such statements are false. For they presuppose that there are objec-
tive values in the world— in this case, the “wrongness” of stealing— but,
he says, there are no such things as objective values. All moral judgments
contain the same error of presupposing the existence of moral values. For
this reason, Mackie’s view has become known as “error theory.”

Mackie presents two main arguments for his conclusion. The first is
the argument from cultural relativity that we have seen in Ruth Benedict’s
writing. Mackie suggests that the great cultural diversity in moral values we
observe in the world is a good reason for believing that there are no objective
truths about morality. The second is known as the argument from “queer-
ness” (using the term in its old- fashioned sense) that if there were objective
values, they would be very odd or queer, unlike anything that exists in the
world. This argument has two parts. The first is metaphysical, in that it
concerns what, fundamentally, exists in the world. Objective values would
be very strange objects. The second part is epistemological, concerning how
we can know values. If values are subjective, then it is very easy to see how
we could know them, for we would have made them for ourselves. But if they
are objective, how do we have the type of engagement with them that would
lead to knowledge? For all these reasons, Mackie concludes that objective
values do not exist and hence our ordinary moral judgments are false.

Harry Frankfurt’s journal article moves us to a different topic. He
considers the thesis that people are morally responsible for their actions
only if they could have acted otherwise. Frankfurt calls this thesis the
“principle of alternate possibilities.” It, or something very like it, is often
taken for granted in ordinary understandings of morality, for if you had
no alternative to doing something, how could you be blamed (or praised)
for doing it? Consider, for example, someone who acts under hypnotic
suggestion or under extreme coercion. But this principle has far- reaching
consequences. For if it turns out that human beings do not have free will
and that all our actions are determined by factors outside our control,
then human beings have no alternative to acting as we do. Then it will
also turn out that we have no moral responsibility and cannot be praised
or blamed for anything.

Part 1: Meta-Ethics ■ 7

8 ■ Part 1: Meta-Ethics

Frankfurt sets out to cast doubt on the principle of alternate possibili-
ties by imagining a case in which someone voluntarily performs an action
which, had that person not chosen to perform the action, someone else
would have forced the person to do. In one example, another person has
taken control of my brain and could change my choices if need be. Whatever
happens, I would have performed the action and hence had no alternative
to doing so. But in this case, because I have voluntarily chosen to undertake
the action, and no intervention was necessary, we have very little hesitation
in saying that I am indeed morally responsible for the action. Frankfurt
wishes …