Write-up

COGNITIVE REPAIRS:
HOW ORGANIZATIONAL PRACTICESCAN

COMPENSATEFOR
INDIVIDUAL SHORTCOMINGS

ChipHeath,RichardP. Larrick, andJoshuaKlayman

ABSTRACT

The literaturein cognitive psychology has described a varietyof shortcomings that
preventindividuals from learningeffectively. We review this literature and provide
examplesofa numberoforganizational practices that may effectivelyrepairthecog-
nitive shortcomingsof individuals. We call these practicescognitiverepairs. We
then discusssix tradeoffs that affect the success of cognitive repairs.We close by
consideringhow a cognitive perspective might benefitthosewho studyorganiza-
tional learning and those who manageit.

Research inOrganizational Behavior, Volume 20, pages 1-37.
Copyright © 1998 hy JAI Press Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISBN: 0-7623-0366-2

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CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, andJOSHUA KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 3

INTRODUCTION

In afamous speech, Hamletdeclares,“What a pieceof work is man.How noble in
reason,how infinite in faculties” (Hamlet, II, 2). An observer whosummarizedthe
psychologyof the late twentiethcenturywould probably choose very different
phrases to describe the humancondition—perhaps,“What fools these mortals be”
(Midsummer Night’sDream, III, 2).

Are people“infinite in faculties” and “noble inreason”?HerbertSimon won a
Nobel prize for arguingthat social science mustunderstandthe waysthat human
facultiesare limited. Instead of being infinite in faculties,Simon’s humans could
be only “boundedlyrational” because theircognitive abilities—their ability to
perceive,remember,andprocessinformation—were restricted. Well, then, ifpeo-
ple arenot infinite in faculties,a.re they “noble inreason”?Cognitive psycholo-
gists havespent30 years examining the actualprocessesthat people usewhen
they collect information, combineit, anddraw inferences about their world(Nis-
bett & Ross, 1980; Kahneman,Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Holland,Holyoak,Nis-
bett, & Thagard,1986).Insteadof depicting people as “noble” (or magnificent) in
reason, this researchhas arguedthat peoplereasonin ways that producesystem-
atic errors. A pessimistic modern Hamlet might combine the observations of these
two research streams and describe humans as equipped with primitive hardwnre
andbuggy software.

However, outsidershave not alwaysacceptedthe pessimistic description of
human faculties and reason that is found in the research literature.As one skeptic
put it, “If we are so stupid,how did we get to the moon?” (Nisbett & Ross,1980).

How should we resolve the apparent discrepancy betweenthe pessimisticliter-
atureon human shortcomings and the optimistic evidence of humanaccomplish-
ment? One way is todismiss the laboratory research. Someresearchershave
argued that the shortcomings that have beendocumentedin the lab areso minor
that they do not constitute mistakes ofany real consequence(Funder, 1987;
Cohen,1981).Others havearguedthat individuals areless likely to make errors in
natural environmentsthan in contrived laboratory experiments (Anderson,1991;
Gigerenzer,1996; Cheng& Holyoak, 1985;Hilton, 1995).

We proposeanotherway to resolvethe discrepancy.Unlike someresearchers,
we do not dismissthe examples of limitations, errors, and biases reported in thelit-
erature; we assume that individuals arelimited, their decision processes are
biased, andthat they often make costly mistakes onimportant decisions. We
resolve the apparent discrepancy between evidence of individualshortcomings
and the empirical factof moonwalksby observing thatindividualsdid not make it
to themoon, NASA did.

Organizationslike NASA may have discovered ways toavoid~orrepair theindi-
vidual shortcomingsthat have been documentedby cognitive researchers.Orga-
nizations may develop such repairs through deliberate analysis, learn them
throughtrial and error, or discoverthem through serendipitous accident.In some

cases, repairsmay derive from formal academicdisciplineslike economicsor sta-
tistics (e.g., Nisbett,1992;Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, &Kunda, 1983; Larrick, Mor-
gan, & Nisbett, 1990), but in most casesthey will not: They will be ad hoc,
intuitive rulesthat emerge from day-to-daypractice. Our thesis,then, isthat indi-
viduals indeed face cognitive limitations and shortcomings, but thatorganizations
can provide individuals withnormsandproceduresthat mitigate theirlimitations
and reduce their shortcomings.

In this paper we describe a variety of potentiallyseriousshortcomingsthat have
beendocumentedin researchon humanjudgmentand reasoning. We focus inpar-
ticular on learning and hypothesis testing,that is, how people use information to
develop and revise theirmental model of the world.Foreach cognitiveshortcom-
ing we discuss, we provide examples of organizational practices thatmay repair
this shortcoming. We call these practicescognitive repairsto emphasize the fact
that they correct somecognitive processthat wasinitially flawed and in need of
repair.

We identify potential cognitive repairs to spurresearchersto considerhow such
repairs might look and function.Althoughat thispoint, we canmake only ananec-
dotal case forinterpretingcertain practicesas “repairs,” we hope that,by pointing
out someplausible examples of such repairs, we willpromptresearchersin both
psychologyand organizationsto considermore systematicallyhow such repairs
might function.

More generally, the concept oforganizationalcognitive repairsillustratesthat
researchers may find interesting relationships betweenindividual cognitionand
organizational practice.Theserelationships have not received the attention they
deserve.On the one side, research in cognitive psychology has largely treated
individual learnersas “rugged individualists”who face a difficult environment
alone, equippedonly with their own, flawed cognitive strategies. On the other
side, organizational research has largely ignored the literature on individualcog-
nition, focusing insteadon issues of motivation orincentives.By studyingorgani-
zational sources of cognitive repairs, we bringtogethertwo frequently disparate
literatures anddemonstratehow knowledge at onelevel of analysiscaninform the
other.

By reviewing individual shortcomingsand identifying potential cognitive
repairs, wealsohope tocontributeto the academic andpopular literatureonorga-
nizational learning (Epple,Argote, & Devadas, 1991; Deming, 1982; Senge,
1990; Cohen, 1991; Miner & Mezias, 1996).One important means tofacilitate
learningby organizations is to develop processes that overcome theshortcomings
of individuals within the organization.

Below, we start with a briefexampleof the kinds of repairs that weconsiderin
this paper. Then we introduce a framework that describes different stages in the
learning process, and we use it toreview the literature onindividual shortcomings
and to suggest potential repairs.As a preliminary reply toHamlet,we say that
even ifruggedindividualsare unlikely to be infinite in faculties and noble inrea-

4 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and JOSHUA KLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs

son, individualswho have access to organizational and cultural repairs maysome-
times appearso.

An Exampleof OurApproach

Consider one studythat might be regardedas an ominous indication of ignoble
reasoningby individual experts. Hynes andVanmarcke(1976) asked seven“inter-
nationally known” civil engineers to predict the height of a structurethat would
cause a foundation tofail; they alsoasked the engineers toset a 50 percentconfi-
dence interval around their prediction sothat their confidenceinterval was wide
enough to have a 50 percent chance of enclosing the true failure height. Theresults
were quitesobering: not one engineer correctly predicted the truefailure height
within his or herconfidenceinterval.

Evidently, the civil engineers thoughtthey knew more thanthey did—if they
had been awareof the limitations of their analysis,they would haveset widercon-
fidenceintervals andwould have predicted the truefailure heightmorecorrectly.
In the psychologicalliterature this kind of finding has been labeled“overconfi-
dence,”and it is not anaberration.Similarresultshave been observed with anum-
ber of individual professionals(e.g., Russo & Schoemaker,1992).In summarizing
the evidence,Griffin and Tversky (1992) quipped that experts are “often wrong
but rarely in doubt.”

To illustrate why this study paintsan ominous picture of individual reasoning,
considerthat (unlessyou arereading this paper outside)you are sitting in abuild-
ing that was constructedby civil engineers who were substantiallyless accom-
plishedthanthe internationally known experts in thestudy. Your civil engineers
made numerous decisions to ensure the stability and safety of yourbuilding; they
decidedhow strong to makeits roofsupports andhow stableto makeits founda-
tton. If evenexpertengineersare overconfident,shouldyou be concerned about
your safety?

The answer, we believe, is no. Fortunately, the engineering profession has
developeda particular repair, called“safety factors,” that mitigatethe overconfi-
dent reasoningof individual engineers.In an actual assignment civil engineers
would preciselycalculatethe amount andstrengthof foundationmaterialsneces-
sary to hold a structure of a particular height,then they would multiply their pre-
cise answerby a safety factor(i.e., a number between three and eight), and use the
larger figure to build the foundation.Were the confidenceintervals of the engi-
neerstoo narrow?Yes. Werethey toonarrow by a factor of three? No.

Safetyfactors arean example of thekindof cognitive repair weconsiderin this
paper.An organization (e.g., an engineeringfirm or the engineering profession at
large) provides its members with a repair thathelps combat a systematic and
potentially serious bias inindividual judgment. As a result,the organization
shields individualswithin the organization from actingon their flawed decisions,

5

and it shields individuals inside andoutsidethe organizationfrom suffering the
consequences.

Whatis a CognitiveRepair?

Organizational repairscanroughly bedivided into two classes: (1) motivational
repairs increase theenergy and enthusiasm with which individuals pursue a task
and (2) cognitive repairs improve the mentalproceduresindividuals use todecide
which task to pursue andhow to pursueit. Organizational research onmotivation
and incentives can be regarded as the study of motivational repairs(Milgrom &
Roberts,1992; Eisenhardt,1989).Organizations may need to repair motivational
problems in order to encourage individuals tolearn(e.g., see Heath,Knez, &

Camerer,1993).For example, individualsmay not be willing toexperimentwith
newtasks becausethey have becomeendowedwith the benefits associated with
the old task.

Although previous work hasrecognizedtheimportanceof motivational repairs,
it hasneglected cognitive repairs. Even when individuals have the right incentives
and resources, theymay not learnfrom their experience ifthey use the wrong
mentalprocess togeneratehypotheses,collectinformation,anddrawconclusions.
The civil engineers who misestimated the stability of the clayembankment.were
adequatelymotivatedto getthe right answer. However,they did not on their.own
invoke the kind of correctives(e.g., safety factors)that might havemadetheir
guesses more appropriately cautious.

REVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL LEARNING AND
EXAMPLES OF COGNITIVE REPAIRS

In this section we organize the literatureon learning and decision making around
three different stages of the learning process. Effective learners must (1) generate
hypotheses that explain thecausalstructureof the world, (2)collectinformation to
distinguishamong theirhypotheses,(3) draw conclusions that areappropriateand
~autious. Theboundariesbetween these stages arefuzzy—theyare interrelated
~ndinterconnected(Klayman, 1995). However, we distinguish among them

ecause theyinvolve different psychological processes.
Our strategythroughoutthe review is to considerfirst the individual then the
‘ganization. For each stageof learning, we describe howan ideal individual
irner might reason, andreview psychological research showing how realmdi-
luals depart from this ideal. Then, we describe potential cognitive repairsby
ich organizations might correct the individual shortcoming in question.

6 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and JOSHUAKLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 7

Generating Hypotheses

In the first stage of the learning process individuals must generate hypotheses
about the relationships amongevents.Subjectto constraints of time andinforma-
tion, individuals should generate hypotheses that are deep(i.e., by considering
causesthat are more general or systemic) and broad(i.e., by considering a larger
numberof potential causes).However,a greatdeal of psychological researchsug-
geststhat individuals develop hypothesesthat are shallowand narrow.

Individuals GenerateHypotheses thatareShallowRatherthanDeep

Individuals Searchfor Explanationsthat MakeThemselvesLook Good

Individuals often conductshallow searches when theytry to explain success or
failure becausethey search in a self-serving way(i.e., in a way that allows them
to feel good about themselves).In a meta-analysisof 91 tests of this self-serving
bias, Mullen and Riordan (1988)show that individuals typically conclude that
their successesresulted from stable, internal factors (e.g., ability), butthat their
Jailures resultedfrom unstable,environmentalfactors (e.g., thedifficulty of the
environment, insufficient effort, or bad luck)(see alsoFiske & Taylor, 1991,
pp. 78-82).

How might organizations repair self-servingbiases?Some repairsmay be quite
simple: Traderson Wall Street are warned, “Don’t confuse brains and a bullmar-
ket” (Odean, 1996).This compactphrase prompts individual traders toconsider
the base rate of success inthe market, and it makes it moredifficult for them to
indulge in self-servingexplanations for their success.

At FloridaPower andLight employeesdevelopeda new way to fightself-serv-
ing biases afteran incident thatprominentlyfeatured aJapaneseinspector for the
Deming Prizewho laterbecamea folk hero withinthe company(Walton, 1990,
p. 61). To impressthe inspector,FP&L managerstook him to visit a new facility
that had been constructed faster and moreeconomicallythan any facility in the
history of theindustry.However, the Deming inspector did notsimply accept the
results at face value and congratulate themon their “quality” projectmanagement;
instead, he asked a number ofquestionsto determinewhythey were so successful.
Themanagers’answerswere so inadequate that it soon becameclearthatthey did
not understandenough about their success torecreateit in the future. The inspec-
tor dismissed their “success” in hisJapanese-accentedEnglish—”you were
rucky.” Later on his phrase, complete withaccent,became a common repairfor
self-serving interpretationsof success.

The Deminginspectordeflated a self-serving biasby consideringalternative
hypotheses for success (e.g., luck rather thanskill or knowledge). Traditionally at
FP&L, managers were not questioned as long as they achievedgood results. After
this incident managerswere much more likely to be asked to explain their sue-

cesses.If they could notdo so, the verdictwould be delivered: “you wererucky”
(Walton, 1990,p. 61). The strategic use of the accent was designed to remindman-
agers about theearlier incident whereluck produceddramaticresults that were
unlikely to be repeated.

Individuals Focuson PeopleRather thanSituations

Individuals alsogeneratea shallow set of hypotheses because social settings
tend to highlight people as causes.In Westernculture individuals typically choose
to explain events in terms of people’s actions and traits rather than situationalfac-
tors (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977; Ross & Nisbett, 1991). In a recent
study observers heardanother studentgive a pro-life or pro-choice speechon
abortion. Afterward, observers assumedspeakersheld attitudes consistent with
their speeches even though the speeches were derived fromscripts written by the
experimentersand even though the observers themselves told the speakers which
position to speak for (Gilbert & Jones,1986).Similarly, Deming (1982) describes
a company that used a varietyof flammableproducts in their production process.
After analyzing the dataon fires, Deming found that the fires were a stable and
predictableoutcomeof the production process.However, according to Deming,
the companypresidentfocusedhis attentionselsewhere.He “sent a letter toevery
one ofthe 10,500employeesof the company to plead with themtoset fewer fires”
(p. 325).

People’s actions are frequently more obvious than their situations.Therefore,
when individuals generate hypotheses about whyan event occurred, their first
hypothesis is likely to bethat someperson caused it(e.g., Ross & Nisbett,1991).
This tendency to focuson people rather than situations has beendocumentedby-so
manyinvestigatorsin so many situations that it has beencalledthefundamental
attributionerror(Ross,1977; for recent reviews see Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Gilbert
& Malone, 1995).

Organizations might repair thefundamentalattributionerrorby remindingiridi-
viduals toconsidercauses other than people,especiallythe peoplewho are likely
to be closest to anyproblem: front-line workers.For example,an old military
adage says, “Thereare no such things as bad troops, only badofficers” (Cohen &
Gooch, 1990, p. 228). Parallel repairs are found in total quality management
(TQM). Ishikawa says, “whenever mistakes occur, two-thirdsto four-fifths of
responsibility rests with management” (Ishikawa,1985,p. ix). Such maximsmay
partially repair thefundamentalattribution errorbecausethey encourageindivid-
uals tolookbeyondthe front line. On the otherhand,they may simply focus the
erroron people at ahigherlevel. Thus, abetter repairmay be one from Deming,
who tells managers thatof the problems he has seen, “94% belong to the system”
(Deming, 1982, p. 315). Ishikawa and Deming both use vivid statistics toover-
comethe fundamentalattribution error even though it isunlikely that either has

8 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and JOSHUAKLAYMAN CognitiveRepairs 9

conducteda preciseempirical analysis.Deming’s “94%” is particularlynotewor-
thy because ofits apparent precision.

Individuals StopSearchingasSoon as TheyGenerateOne Hypothesis

Self-serving biases andthe fundamentalattribution error are specialcasesof a
much broader tendency:Individuals tend to stopsearchingfor a causeas soonas
they locate a plausible candidate hypothesis(Gregory, Cialdini, & Carpenter,
1982;Hoch, 1984).

To counterthis generaltendency,organizations have developedsome repairs
that arewidely applicableacrossa numberof domains.In onetechniqueknown as
the “Five Whys,” workersat Toyota learned to ask “why?”five times beforethey
stoppedgenerating hypotheses. Whenthey did so, they were more likely tofind a
root cause ratherthan a superficialone.Imai (1986) illustrates thetechniquewith
the following example:

Question1:
Answer I:
Question2:
Answer2:
Question3:
Answer3:
Question4:
Answer4:
Question5:
AnswerS:

Why did the machine stop?
Because the fuseblew dueto an overload.
Why wastherean overload?
Becausethe bearinglubrication was inadequate.
Why wasthe lubricationinadequate?
Becausethe lubrication pumpwas not functioningright.
Why wasn’tthe lubricating pumpworking right’?
Becausethe pump axle woreout.
Why wasit worn out?
Because sludgegot in.

Imai arguesthat by asking “why” five times,workers identified “the real cause
and therefore the realsolution: attaching astrainerto the lubricating pump. If
workers had notgone through such repetitive questions,they might havesettled
with an intermediatecountermeasure,such asreplacingthe fuse” (Imai, 1986, p.
50). Another illustrationof the Five Whys deals directly with thefundamental
attribution error: “Problem: He doesn’t manage well. (1)Why? He’s not on the
floor. (2)Why?He’s in the equipment room. (3) Why? The newest equipment isn’t
working. (4) Why? Purchasing gave the supplier a short leadtime. (5) Why?Poor
planning system”(Forum, 1992, p. 54). In general, when individuals ask“why”
the first time, they are likely to developanswersthat invoke somesalient, recent,
or proximal event (e.g.,someperson’sactions). Subsequentwhys are likely to
cause individuals to think more broadly and situationally.

Although the Five Whys is an admirable cognitive repair becauseof its power
and simplicity,individuals may find it difficult to executeby themselves.When
individuals have one good hypothesis in mind,that hypothesisoften blocks their
ability to seealternatives(Gregory,Cialdini, & Carpenter,1982; Gnepp & Klay-
man,1992; Mynatt, Doherty,& Dragan, 1993).For example, Hoch (1984) found

that subjectswho generatedpro reasons for buying aproducthad more difficulty
generating conreasonsimmediately afterward.

If individuals find itdifficult to generate alternate hypotheseson their own,then
organizationsmay repairshallow searchby confronting individuals with others
who are expertin asking questionsthat reveal deep causes. AtMicrosoft, Bill
Gateshas by personal example, encouraged aculturethat relieson relentlessques-
tioning. Says oneWindows manager, “yougo into the meetings andyou come out
just sweating because, if there is anyflaw, he will land on it immediately and pick
itto bits” (Cusumano &Selby, 1995,p. 25). Employees “overuse” terms borrowed
from Gates,like “drill down” asa euphemism for “going into more detail” (“What
Bill GatesReally Wants,” 1995).

A similar cognitive repair isfound in theorganizationthat administersthe Dem-
ing quality prize. Here, official Deming inspectorsexaminemanagers using a
techniquecalled“single-caseborequestions.”They begin with broad exploratory
queries andthen relentlessly delve down intoweaknessesand omissions inthe
answersthey receive. Single-case borequestionssometimes identifycausesthat
arequite deep. For example,FloridaPower andLight often had to deal with power
outagesthat occurredwhen a treefell on a powerline and severedit. To improve
the reliability of its service,FP&L organized a unit to trim all the trees in sites
where damage had occurred, and thus prevent future outages. Managers at FP&L
congratulated themselves for creating aprocedurethat preventedfutureproblems.
However, the Deming inspectors were not satisfied with theproceduresince~itpre-
vented problems only in areas that had already experienced acrisis.Theysearched
for a solution at adeeperlevel, and askedmanagersa numberof questionsabout
what might beconsideredforestry! What kind of trees grow in theregion?Do
palms grow faster or slowerthan oaks? Managersat FP&L realized they did not
know the answers to these questions, and thatthey had not searcheddeeply
enough tosolve their problems. After their experience with single-caseboreques-
tions, FP&L managers consulted with foresters anddevelopeda regularmainte-
nanceprocedureto trim trees basedon their growth ratesand acrossthe entire
region, notjust in areas wheretreeshad previously severed lines Afterparticipat-
ing in sessionsof this kind with the Deminginspectors,managersat the firm
learned to ask single-case borequestionsin their own internal discussions, thus
institutionalizingthis cognitive repair(Walton, 1990,pp. 57-63).

Individuals GenerateHypothesesthat areNarrow RatherThanBroad

In an ideal world individual learnerswould not only generatedeeperhypothe-
ses;they would alsoconsidera broad ratherthan narrow set of potentialhypothe-
ses. However, even when individuals generate alternativehypotheses,their
“alternatives” often differonly slightly from one another,and all lie within the
same general frame.For example,participants in oneexperimentwere asked to
considerthe serious parking problem facedby their university, and they were

10 CHIP HEATH, RICHARD P. LARRICK, and JOSHUAKLAYMAN
Cognitive Repairs 11

given time togenerateas manysolutionsasthey could (Gettys etal., 1987).Com-
bined,participants generated about300 solutionsthat researcherswere later able
to classify into about seven majorcategories.One category, for example,sug-
gested ways to reduce demand for parking (e.g.,by increasing parking fees) and
anothersuggested waystouse parking moreefficiently (e.g.,by segregatingpark-
ing slots according tosize). The averageparticipantproposed about11 solutions
but these11 solutionsrepresented only about three of the seven possiblecatego-
ries. The authors askedan independentpanel ofexpertsto compile a completelist
of high-qualitysolutions, andthey used thiscompletelist to assesshow many
solutionswere missedby eachindividual. The typical participant missed from70
to 80 percent of the high-quality solutions.However, when asked, individuals
believedthey had missed only25 percent.

Evenexpertsfail toconsiderahrQadrangeof alternative hypotheses.Forexam-
ple, one group ofresearchersshowed professional automechanicsa “fault tree”
that listed a number of hypotheses aboutwhy a car might notstart (e.g., battery,
starting system,fuel system,ignition). Some mechanics were presented with a
“full tree” that containedsevenspecific hypotheses,otherswere givena ‘~pruned
tree” that omittedsome important hypotheses (e.g. the ignition system). The
resultsindicatedthat when hypotheses were prunedoff the tree, mechanics did not
adequatelyconsiderthem (Fischhoff,Slovic, & Lichtenstein,1978).

How might organizationsrepair narrow search by individuals?Individuals
might search more broadly ifthey arecuedto think about a problem from different
perspectives.At Sharp, employees are told to be “dragonfliesbut not flatfish.”
Dragonflieshavecompound eyes and see things from multiple perspectives at
once, butflatfish havelargeeyes that onlylookin one direction (Nonaka &Takeu-
chi, 1995).

The “dragonfly” repair exhorts individuals toconsiderdifferent perspectives,
but thismay be difficult for individuals to do by themselves. Organizations might
repairnarrow search more effectivelyby encouraging individualsto- recruit others
who havedifferent perspectives. A good example of this is providedby Bridge-
stone Tire,which conducts “kokai watches” togeneratealternative hypotheses for
improving workpractices.During akokai watch a group ofup to a dozenpeople,
from different areas of afactory, gather for a few hours to watch otherswork. In
one four-hour watch adozenpeople identified63 potential dangers with a new
machine(Walton, 1990,pp. 200-201).

The kokai watchhas a numberof features that ensure that watchersgeneratea
broadarray of hypotheses. First, it mandates alargenumber of watchers (up to
12). Second, it selects watchers from a variety of different areas—in one kokai
watchthat examineddie and material changes, watchers included a plantvisitor,
a memberof the humanresourcesstaff, a chemist, and a project manager. “The
idea was that people could observe a process, even thosewho were strangers toit,
with fresheyes,seeing thingsthat closelyinvolved workersmight not” (Walton,
1990, p. 200). Third, it ensures that watchers do notdiscardhypothesesprema-

turely. The watchersare instructed to “write down anything,‘Hey, looks like the
guy is walking toomuch,’ or ‘Looks like he’snot handlingthe knife right”’ (Wal-
ton, 1990,p. 201). Only after watchers generate hypothesesindependentlyarethe
results combined andfiltered.

Otherorganizational procedures also repairnarrow individual searchby ensur-
ing that individuals generate hypothesesindependently.For example, when
Motorola formscross-functionalteams toevaluate new products,they do not
allow employees who have participated in one product team to participate in
anotherteam with a similarproduct. This prohibition limitsthe pool of potential
team members in acostlyway; evaluation teamsinvolve six to nine people and
spendtwo to three months to develop a business plan for the newproduct. How-
ever, by consciously disregardingprevious experience,Motorola allows new
teams to develop recommendations independently from previous teams. At the
same time, Motorolaavoids losing the knowledgeof previous “veterans”—they
serve asa “review team” that evaluatesthe recommendationsof the newestteam.2

Other repairsensure that a broad range ofalternativesare consideredsimulta-
neously.Somecompaniesdivide aproductdevelopmentteam into competingsub-
groups which develop separate projectproposals,and only later recombine to
debatethe advantages and disadvantages of theindependent proposals.Again, this
strategy is costly because it is redundant.However, it may have advantages
becausethe built-in independenceensuresthat different subgroups will approach
a problemfrom different perspectives (Nonaka & Takeuchi,1995,p. 14).

CollectingInformation

In the second stage of the learning process ideal learnerscollectinformation to
test and revise their hypotheses. Therearetwo main sources of such information:
the information that individuals already have in their memory and theinformation
that they collect from theenvironment.Both …